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META RIGHTS
Charlotte Garden*
Are individuals entitled to notice of their constitutional rights or
assistance in exercising those rights? In most contexts, the answer is no.
Yet, there are some important exceptions, in which the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that special circumstances call for notice and procedural
protections designed to facilitate rights invocations. This Article refers to
these entitlements as “meta rights”—rights that protect rights. The most
famous of these is the Miranda warning, which notifies suspects of their
Fifth Amendment rights to silence and an attorney. There are others as
well—among them, the First Amendment right of individuals represented by
public sector labor unions and bar associations to notice of their right not
to subsidize certain union or bar association speech. Certain procedural
due process rights also qualify as meta rights, including the notice of the
right to litigate individually to which many class members are entitled.
The reason for the Miranda warning, as well as for similar notice rights
in the procedural due process context, is clear: each aids individuals in
overcoming high external barriers to protecting their own rights through
self-help. But what justifies meta rights that help union members and
attorneys exercise their rights against compelled subsidization of political
speech, where there are generally no significant barriers to self-help?
Alternatively, why aren’t there meta rights in other compelled speech and
subsidization contexts? And, if meta rights are appropriate, how robust
should they be?
This Article takes up these questions, arguing that the self-help rationale
offers a way to determine when meta rights are required in various
constitutional contexts, including in the context of compelled speech and
subsidization of speech. It then addresses the challenges inherent in
structuring meta rights, which are accentuated where meta rights are owed
by private associations—such as unions and bar associations—that have
their own First Amendment rights. Ultimately, this Article argues that
courts cannot ignore the competing interests of associational speakers and
willing members when they determine the scope of meta rights in the
* Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law. For their suggestions and
encouragement, I am grateful to Robert Chang, Brooke Coleman, Owen Davies, David
Gartner, Nancy Leong, Christina Parajon, Anna Roberts, Andrew Siegel, David Skover, and
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Constitution Society.
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compelled speech and subsidization context. Thus, to the extent that courts
conclude that meta rights themselves implicate the First Amendment, they
should account for the possibility that some meta rights do more than just
allow dissenters to avoid unwanted speech: they actually encourage optouts, and correspondingly discourage speech.
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional ―meta rights‖—notice and process rights that are coupled
with substantive constitutional rights—exist in just a handful of contexts.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not explained why this is so, though there are
clues to be divined from cases mandating meta rights in particular contexts.
Likewise, while scholars have filled volumes about the scope of meta rights
in particular contexts, this Article is the first to compare the Court‘s
differing approaches to these rights across contexts.
This Article begins by considering one area in which the Court has not
only established a meta right but also offered a detailed justification for it:
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the Miranda warning.1 It then turns to the closely analogous issue of
procedural due process rights, and in particular absent class members‘
entitlement to notice of their opt-out rights. These examples, grounded
respectively in the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, illustrate that
meta rights are usually found where rights-holders cannot otherwise engage
in self-help, either because of coercion or because they lack necessary
facts—a condition this Article argues is the critical determinant of whether
meta rights should be required in a given context.
This Article then applies the lessons of Miranda and class action notice
rights to First Amendment rights against compelled speech and
subsidization, where the Court has held, without explanation, that meta
rights are called for only sporadically. In other words, while dissenters
often have rights against compelled speech or subsidization, only some
institutional speakers are constitutionally required not just to tolerate dissent
but also to facilitate it. For example, labor unions must annually provide
notice and procedural protections to represented employees who have a
right not to pay for union political speech.2 Bar associations are in theory
required to provide the same protections to attorneys,3 though they often
fall short in practice.4 Yet, public school students are not entitled to notice
of their First Amendment right not to say the Pledge of Allegiance, even
though students are more vulnerable to coercion than either employees or
attorneys.5
After considering the availability of self-help in these contexts, the
Article concludes that meta rights, if available at all with respect to
compelled speech and subsidization, should be distributed differently than
they are now. In particular, the most vulnerable potential dissenters—
school children—do not currently receive meta rights but have the strongest
case for them; while the least vulnerable—food producers participating in
certain generic advertising schemes—do not need the protections they now
receive. Workers and attorneys fall in between those groups: they do not
face significant coercion but sometimes face informational deficits.
However, even if these deficits justify some meta rights in the union and
bar association context, the Court‘s recent decision6 strengthening the meta
rights that unions owe represented workers significantly exceeds the
justification for those meta rights. Worse, if one accepts the Court‘s
premise that the First Amendment requires strengthened meta rights in
order to discourage workers from sleeping on their rights, then the Court‘s
own cure for that problem is as bad as the disease, because it will similarly
harm a different set of workers—those who sleep on their rights to speak.
1.
2.
I.C.1.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also infra Part I.B.1.
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234–35 (1977); see also infra Part
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1990); see also infra Part I.C.2.
See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); see also infra Part I.D.1.
See Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int. Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
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Given these considerations, and assuming meta rights are at least
sometimes called for in the compelled speech context, what should they
entail? Here, there are two possibilities: first, notice; and second, structural
protections that set behavioral constraints designed to prompt (or
discourage) rights invocations. Both notice and structural meta rights in the
First Amendment context raise challenging questions regarding the rights of
private associational speakers. First, notice rights often call for compelled
speech, implicating associations‘ rights.7 Second, structural rights, like the
opt-in default that applies in the context of certain union dues increases,
raise another set of concerns. Behavioral science shows that defaults are
not neutral; instead, they are behavioral prompts that encourage individuals
to make one decision over another.8 So, if speech-promoting defaults
violate the First Amendment—as the Court recently held in one context9—
then so should speech-discouraging defaults. Put another way, either none
of these defaults violate the First Amendment, and thus can be left to either
legislatures or private ordering, or all of them do. However, all is not lost
even if the Court concludes that all speech defaults implicate the First
Amendment, because careful design of meta rights can minimize
infringements on speakers‘ rights and interests while still protecting
dissenters.10
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I defines meta rights and
discusses their scope in the Miranda and compelled speech and
subsidization contexts, as well as the closely related procedural due process
context.11 Then, in Part II, the Article argues that the availability of First
Amendment meta rights should turn on whether underlying rights can
reasonably be invoked through self-help, and should be structured to
minimize interference with willing speakers.
I. RIGHTS AND META RIGHTS
This part begins with a brief general discussion of meta rights, defining
them and differentiating them from other types of constitutional rights.
Next, it turns to two key areas of constitutional law regarding notice and
process rights: first, the right against self-incrimination; and second,
procedural due process, particularly the example of class action notice
rights. Finally, it turns to compelled speech and subsidization of speech,
where courts have imposed meta rights only sporadically, and without
meaningful explanation. This Part provides the basis for Part II, which
critiques the Court‘s distribution of meta rights in the compelled speech
context and proposes a better way forward.
7. See infra Part II.C.1.
8. See infra Part II.C.2.
9. See Knox, 132 S. Ct. 2277.
10. See infra Part II.C.2.
11. The analogy between meta rights and procedural due process rights prior to
deprivations of property or liberty is a close one. Moreover, some procedural due process
rights—including the right to the class action notice, on which I focus as an example—fits
the definition of a meta right.
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A. Defining Meta Rights
Meta rights, which require potential rights infringers to help others
invoke their rights by providing notice or other protections, are derived
from the same source as the substantive rights that they protect. Probably
the most famous meta right is the Miranda warning, which notifies
individuals undergoing custodial interrogation of their Fifth Amendment
rights against self-incrimination.12 The idea is that Miranda makes rights
invocation easier (and therefore more likely) by informing those undergoing
custodial interrogation that they are entitled to choose to remain silent and
that making a different choice may have negative consequences.13 Thus,
meta rights eliminate certain barriers to rights invocation.14
Meta rights can be based in legislation or the Constitution. While this
Article is concerned with constitutional meta rights, statutory meta rights
are relatively common. For example, employers are required to inform
employees about a host of workplace rights arising under statutes such as
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act15 and the Fair Labor Standards Act.16
These statutory protections reflect congressional or administrative
judgments that particular rights or entitlements will be better respected and
more robustly enforced if potential violators must tell potential victims
about their rights.17
In contrast to Congress or the Executive, courts generally proceed as
though individuals are aware of their constitutional rights, whether or not
this assumption is borne out empirically.18 Thus, constitutional meta rights
12. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966).
13. This is not to say that the Miranda warning makes rights invocation objectively easy.
See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in
Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 260–61 (1993) (demonstrating challenges
associated with invoking Miranda rights and arguing that these difficulties will be amplified
for women and minorities).
14. In other contexts, both courts and commentators commonly recognize the value of
structures that improve individuals‘ abilities to understand the scope of their rights. The
common law system of precedent is such a structure. As one commentator has observed:
The protection of settled expectations is among the most prevalent justifications
for deferring to precedent. When a court issues an opinion, stakeholders modify
their behaviors in response. Judicial delineation of the applicable rules affects
commercial activities such as the formation of contracts, allocation of investments,
and organization of business operations. It influences governmental decisions
such as the crafting of legislation designed to foster democratic objectives within
lawful bounds. It even affects societal understandings regarding the content of the
legal backdrop against which citizens arrange their lives.
Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91
TEX. L. REV. 1843, 1855 (2013).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10 (2012).
16. 29 C.F.R. § 516.4 (2014).
17. Meta rights could have multiple beneficial effects, in addition to educating
individuals about their rights: first, the process of notifying individuals of their rights could
serve an educative function for institutions themselves, thereby preventing inadvertent
violations; and second, having to provide notice could make institutions acutely aware that
individuals know their rights, which could itself deter violations.
18. See, e.g., infra note 61 and accompanying text. A significant body of literature
shows that where warnings are not required, individuals often are not aware of their rights to
avoid encounters with police. E.g., Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment,
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are unusual. Where they exist, they are generally announced by courts in
the course of articulating substantive constitutional protections.19 Yet, it
may not be apparent from the constitutional text itself that meta rights are
required;20 further, as discussed in the remainder of this Article, the Court
shapes meta rights in response to a range of concerns, both constitutional
and practical.
Despite their common source, meta rights are distinct from the
substantive rights that they protect. Analyzing meta rights in Hohfeldian21
terms clarifies the distinction. Consider the First Amendment context:
First Amendment rights are generally ―privileges‖—rights that protect
individuals‘ choices to speak or not speak against interference by the
government, but do not impose affirmative duties on the government to
furnish individuals with opportunities for speech or silence.22 But a right to
receive notice of one‘s First Amendment rights is a ―claim‖ right—one that
corresponds to a duty owed by the government,23 or, in some compelled
100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 1023 (2002) (arguing that the Court‘s own analysis reflects the idea
that people who do not know their constitutional rights are likely to feel compelled to assent
to a police officer‘s request for permission to search); Lewis R. Katz, “Lonesome Road”:
Driving Without the Fourth Amendment, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1413, 1466 (2013)
(asserting that the Court‘s body of law regarding consensual searches is ―based upon a
misperception that Americans know their rights‖).
19. Some meta rights first articulated by the Court are later shaped or enhanced by
legislatures. See infra Part II.B. As I discuss below, the Due Process Clause mandates that
absent class members in certain class actions receive notice and an opportunity to opt out of
the class. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). However, the
notice procedure is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2), which tracks the
Due Process requirements. See infra Part I.B.2. Likewise, some state legislatures mandate
more robust protections for objecting union members than are required by the Court. See
infra Part I.C.1.
20. For example, the Court only recently clarified that the warnings announced in
Miranda are constitutionally required. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000)
(holding that Miranda announced a constitutional rule, but acknowledging that the Court
had, in previous cases, used language suggesting Miranda was subconstitutional). Before
Dickerson, a significant body of scholarship debated the constitutional status of the Miranda
warning. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibrium in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1044 & n.162, 1045 (2010)
(aggregating articles articulating both sides of the debate over Miranda); see also Joseph D.
Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80
NW. U. L. REV. 100, 106–07 (1985) (arguing that Miranda warnings are not constitutionally
required, and that Miranda‘s prophylactic rule was illegitimate); David A. Strauss, The
Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 195 (1988) (critiquing Grano‘s
argument).
21. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld famously constructed a taxonomy of rights,
distinguishing between claims, liberties, authorities, and immunities. See generally Wesley
N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
22. See Hohfeld, supra note 21, at 32 (defining ―privilege‖ as an entitlement to take an
action without interference and distinguishing a privilege from a claim right, which
corresponds to an affirmative duty that someone else must undertake); Frederick Schauer,
Hohfeld’s First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 914, 916 (2008) (noting that the First
Amendment is ―a privilege or a liberty in Hohfeldian language‖ and ―not a right to have the
actual opportunity to speak, nor is it a right to have a platform for speaking, nor is it the right
to have an audience‖).
23. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
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speech contexts, a union or bar association. That is, where individuals are
entitled to notice of their rights not to speak, there is a corresponding duty
to provide notice that is imposed on an institutional speaker.24 The same is
true of the Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination: it is a
privilege, which means that the government cannot interfere with the
privilege where it exists, though it is not bound by any affirmative duty to
provide opportunities for silence. On the other hand, the right to receive the
Miranda warning is a claim right that correlates with a duty to provide the
warning.25
This distinction is significant because it underscores that meta rights are
distinct from rights. Nonetheless, they are often discussed interchangeably,
or as though the meta right is merely an extension of the right. However,
this conflation obscures the unusual and distinct nature of court-created
meta rights and prevents them from being understood together as a class.
Accordingly, I discuss in the next section existing rights and meta rights,
focusing on the Court‘s rationale for providing the latter. I then turn to the
First Amendment right not to speak or subsidize speech, where meta rights
exist only sporadically, and without explanation.
B. Baseline Meta Rights
Although constitutional meta rights are relatively rare, some important
exceptions stand out.26 This section begins with the Miranda warning,
which is the most thoroughly explained meta right. I then turn to
procedural due process rights, focusing in particular on the right of certain
class members to receive notice of their opt-out and objection rights. As I
discuss, not all procedural due process rights qualify as meta rights.
However, procedural due process is a helpful reference point in considering
why the Court sometimes views notice and other protections as critical to
allowing individuals to invoke their substantive rights.
Finally, while the Miranda warning and class action notice right are
grounded, respectively, in the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination and Due Process, they each involve, in a sense, rights to
24. Hohfeld, supra note 21, at 31–32 (a ―claim right‖ correlates with a duty owed by
another); Schauer, supra note 22, at 916 (―[A] positive right is one for which there is a claim
on the state to provide just that which the right guarantees.‖).
25. See Laurent Sacharoff, Miranda’s Hidden Right, 63 ALA. L. REV. 535, 540 (2012)
(―At the core of the Fifth Amendment lies a Hohfeldian ‗liberty,‘ the liberty not to speak.
On the perimeter, protecting the liberty like soldiers, stand several Hohfeldian ‗claims.‘‖).
26. In addition to the meta rights discussed in this Article, other meta rights have been
established in connection with criminal trials, where notice of constitutional rights is often
provided either by judges or by constitutionally guaranteed counsel. For example, a robust
meta rights regime discourages criminal defendants from waiving their right to counsel
during a trial. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (holding that defendants have a
right to represent themselves, but underscoring that the waiver of the right to counsel must
be knowing and voluntary, and requiring that the defendant be ―made aware of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‗he knows
what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open‘‖). However, I focus on Miranda
and class action notice and opt-out rights because of the close analogy that can be drawn
between these situations and the right to avoid compelled speech or subsidization.
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silence—to refrain from participating in police interrogation, or to refrain
from litigation (or shape one‘s own lawsuit), which is a form of petitioning
under the First Amendment that can also constitute expressive advocacy.27
Thus, the Court‘s rationale for creating meta rights in each of these areas
can lend important insights to the development of meta rights in the
compelled speech and subsidization context.
1. Miranda Warnings
Miranda v. Arizona28 established the mandatory Miranda warning, a
meta right to notice that will be familiar to anyone who has ever watched a
police procedural. Like the body of law governing the Miranda warning,
the volume of scholarly literature analyzing the decision and its
consequences is massive.29 However, scholars have not focused on the
similarities between the Miranda warning and decisions finding meta rights
in other contexts.
Why give suspects information about their constitutional rights, rather
than either assuming that they are constructively aware of their rights or
relying on the suspects themselves to ask for clarification? The Miranda
Court answered this question in some detail. It began by listing the
conditions that were critical to its conclusion that a warning was required:
―incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere.‖30 The Court then explained the significance of these
conditions and their deleterious effect on the ―individual‘s right to choose
between silence and speech.‖31 It stressed that police are specially trained
to convince suspects to waive their constitutional right to remain silent and
decide to ―talk,‖32 emphasizing that police practice could go beyond mere
27. The Court has observed that litigation can be expressive, and even non-expressive
litigation is protected under the First Amendment‘s Petition Clause. Cal. Motor Transp. Co.
v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (―The right of access to courts is indeed
but one aspect of the right of petition.‖); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963)
(holding that litigation aimed at ―achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment‖ is
―political expression‖ protected by the First Amendment); see also infra Part I.B.2.
28. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
29. E.g., THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING (Richard Leo & George
C. Thomas III eds., 1998) (compiling essays regarding history, constitutionality, policy, and
ethics of Miranda warning); Ainsworth, supra note 13; Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B.
Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV.
857, 858 (1995) (arguing that ―the government should be allowed to require a suspect to
answer relevant questions in a civilized pretrial hearing presided over by a judge or
magistrate,‖ after which ―compelled pretrial statements can never be introduced against him
in a criminal case but that reliable fruits of such statements virtually always can be‖);
Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize
Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1842 (1987) (arguing that ―[a]ll suspects in custody
should have a nonwaivable right to consult with a lawyer before being interrogated by the
police‖); Strauss, supra note 20.
30. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
31. Id. at 469.
32. Id. at 449–50 (describing a police training manual that directs police to interrogate
suspects outside of their own homes, because a suspect at home ―is more keenly aware of his
rights and more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions of criminal behavior within the walls of
his home‖).
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encouragement to ―persua[sion], trick[ery], and cajol[ing].‖33 The Court‘s
concern was that psychologically coercive interrogation practices involving
an ―unfamiliar atmosphere‖ and ―menacing police interrogation
procedures‖ would undermine suspects‘ abilities to stand on their
constitutional rights, rendering their subsequent statements not ―truly the
product of free choice.‖34 Further, these conditions made it unlikely that
suspects would be able to effectively request counsel, creating a vicious
cycle in which coerced suspects would be kept both ignorant of their rights
and deterred from learning about them.35
The Court elaborated on this reasoning in subsequent cases. In Berkemer
v. McCarty,36 the Court considered whether the Miranda warning was
required either when a motorist was stopped by the side of the road for a
suspected traffic offense, or later when the same suspect was arrested for a
relatively minor traffic offense and taken to the police station.37 Beginning
with the second question, the Court held that the Miranda warning is
required any time a suspect is taken into custody, even when the triggering
offense is a misdemeanor.38 Again, the Court stressed the difficulty of
invoking one‘s rights against self-incrimination in the face of police tactics,
as well as the usefulness of a bright-line rule.39
More telling was the Berkemer Court‘s holding regarding the need (or
lack thereof) for a Miranda warning during a traffic stop. As the Court put
it, the question was ―whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person
pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against
self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional
rights.‖40 Answering that question in the negative, the Court focused on
two bases for distinguishing a traffic stop from custodial interrogation: that
the traffic stop is brief and that it is public.41 The presumptive brevity of a
traffic stop meant that motorists likely would be aware that they would have
33. Id. at 455.
34. Id. at 457.
35. Id. at 465–66 (describing how police denial of a suspect‘s request for counsel
―heightened [the suspect‘s] dilemma, and made his later statements the product of this
compulsion‖).
36. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
37. Id. at 422–23.
38. Id. at 433.
39. Id. at 432–33. Some scholars have also emphasized the usefulness of a bright-line
rule to distinguish voluntary from involuntary statements to police, sometimes suggesting
that the Court could improve on Miranda in ways that further eliminate the need for hearings
regarding issues related to Miranda warnings. E.g., Ogletree, supra note 29. Others have
argued that Miranda‘s bright-line rule can actually be counterproductive when judges are
lulled ―into admitting confessions with little inquiry into voluntariness.‖ Richard A. Leo,
Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000,
1026 (2001); see also Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673,
745–46 (1992) (observing that in the twenty-five years following Miranda, ―the Court has
reversed only two convictions on the ground that post-Miranda custodial interrogation
produced an involuntary statement,‖ in contrast to twenty-three reversals pre-Miranda, and
further, ―lower courts have adopted an attitude toward voluntariness claims that can only be
called cavalier‖).
40. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437.
41. Id. at 437–38.
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to withstand police questioning for only a short time before being allowed
to continue on their way.42 The public nature of the stop meant that police
officers would have fewer opportunities for ―illegitimate means to elicit
self-incriminating statements . . . diminish[ing] the motorist‘s fear that, if he
does not cooperate, he will be subjected to abuse.‖43 In combination, these
factors meant that those stopped by the police would not be coerced into
waiving their constitutional rights.
For similar reasons, the Court has held that the Miranda warning need
not be given before a suspect is interrogated by an undercover officer or
police informant.44 In that situation, the suspect is unaware that ―the
listeners have official power over him.‖45 This combination negates the
―interplay between police interrogation and police custody‖ with which the
Miranda court was concerned.46 In other words, suspects in these
circumstances who wish to remain silent should be able to do so without the
benefit of a warning. Likewise, the Court has held that police need not
inform suspects that their attorneys are trying to reach them, reasoning that
―[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely
unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend
and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.‖47
These cases reveal that the Court‘s concern in developing the Miranda
warning was not simply that criminal defendants may be unaware of their
Fifth Amendment rights.48 Rather, the Court has been concerned only
about situations in which even criminal suspects with baseline knowledge
of their rights would be unable to invoke because of anticipated or actual
police coercion. This explains why the same suspect in Berkemer was
entitled to a warning once he was arrested, but not when he was stopped by
the side of the road—even though he was equally likely to be aware (or not)
of his rights at both times. Thus, the meta rights regime announced in
Miranda is aimed at alleviating specific state-created conditions that
discourage rights invocation.
2. Procedural Due Process and Notice Rights in Aggregate Litigation
Procedural due process rights occupy an ambiguous position in the
rights/meta rights framework. At minimum, they are often quite similar to
meta rights in that they demand that individuals receive notice and other
protections before they are deprived of liberty or property interests. 49 Yet,
42. Id. at 437.
43. Id. at 438.
44. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 299–300 (1990).
45. Id. at 297.
46. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and
Miranda: What Is “Interrogation”? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1, 63 (1978)).
47. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986).
48. See Yale Kamisar, Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later: A Close Look at the Majority
and Dissenting Opinions in Dickerson, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 403 (2001) (―Miranda has
been criticized from the outset for failing to recognize ‗the improbability, if not the
impossibility, of an intelligent waiver‘ of one‘s Miranda rights.‖).
49. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
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procedural due process rights most often attach to liberty or property
interests that are created by statute,50 rather than to substantive rights that
flow from the Due Process Clause itself. Thus, procedural due process
rights are often separate from the underlying interests that they protect—
though there are some exceptions, including in the class action context51—
whereas meta rights are grounded in the same sources as the underlying
rights that they protect.52 However, even when procedural due process
rights are not meta rights as I have defined them, they may still provide
useful insights about when and why courts require that rights-holders
receive notice and process protections.
In Mathews v. Eldridge,53 the Court announced the modern framework
for determining when procedural due process protections, including the
right to notice and a hearing, attach to government decisions depriving
individuals of liberty or property interests. Under the Mathews test, courts
are to weigh
first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and [the] probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government‘s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.54

50. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (―Property
interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law.‖); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 256, 264 (1970)
(holding that procedural due process requires a hearing before discontinuance of statutorily
created welfare benefits).
51. See infra notes 67, 69 and accompanying text. I focus in particular on the class
action context because of its analytical similarities to meta rights that arise in the First
Amendment context. However, other procedural due process rights—those that attach to
substantive due process rights—may also qualify as meta rights. See Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 382 (1970) (finding procedural due process right for indigent divorce
petitioners to be excused from filing fee requirement). However, the Court is often
imprecise about the relationship between substantive and procedural due process rights,
leaving some ambiguity as to where meta rights exist—a topic to be explored in future work.
52. In other words, procedural due process does not require that any particular liberty or
property interest be created; it simply imposes an external constraint on government actors
who choose to create such an interest. See generally Mathews, 424 U.S. 319. In contrast, the
Court derived the notice requirements announced in Miranda and the compelled speech
cases, discussed in Part I.C–D, by interpreting and applying the Fifth and First Amendments,
respectively; similarly, the due process right to opt out of certain class actions, discussed in
this part, itself requires that class members receive notification of their rights. Likewise,
meta rights in statutory contexts are generally created either in the same statutes that create
the underlying rights (as in the case of Title VII), or else they are created by administrative
agencies charged with executing the underlying statute (as in the case of the Fair Labor
Standards Act). Accordingly, meta rights are not coextensive with procedural rights; instead
only those notice and structural rights that are bundled with the rights they are intended to
protect qualify as meta rights.
53. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
54. Id. at 335.
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Courts have applied the Mathews tests to a range of situations with varying
and often unpredictable results, leading to a significant body of criticism.55
For example, while public employees often have property interests in their
jobs, the Court has adopted a case-by-case approach to determining how
much process is due, sometimes requiring an informal hearing before an
employee is fired, but other times allowing public employers to act first,
and provide process later.56
Though the process required by procedural due process varies, it often
consists of a pre-deprivation, nonjudicial hearing, which must be preceded
by adequate notice.57 It goes nearly without saying that the purpose of the
administrative hearing is to avoid erroneous deprivations, though others
have pointed out that hearings may have other benefits as well.58 The
reason for the accompanying notice right is similarly straightforward:
―Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order
that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.‖59 In other words,
the required notice provides factual information so that the hearing recipient
can participate meaningfully.60 In contrast, the Court has held that due
process does not require notice of legal rights, which are ―generally
55. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 330–31 (1993) (describing
limits to Mathews test); Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An
Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUDIES 307, 373–75 (1994) (describing scholarly criticism
of Mathews and arguing the Mathews test is ―confused‖); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme
Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 46–57 (1976) (arguing
Mathews is overly utilitarian); Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1309, 1326–34 (2012) (describing criticism of Mathews); Richard B. Saphire, Specifying
Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 111, 154–56 (1978) (arguing Mathews undervalues dignitary interests); Eric
K. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 354–55 (1990) (arguing Mathews can be criticized as overly
utilitarian).
56. Compare Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985) (public
employee entitled to pre-termination informal hearing), with Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924,
935 (1997) (police officer not entitled to pre-suspension hearing after arrest on drug
charges), and Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898
(1961) (public employee not entitled to notice or opportunity to be heard before security
badge was revoked, resulting in termination of employment). See also J. Michael
McGuinness, Procedural Due Process Rights of Public Employees: Basic Rules and a
Rationale for a Return to Rule-Oriented Process, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 931, 935 (1999)
(observing that ―the Supreme Court has declined to specify any litmus test as to what
procedural safeguards must be afforded to public employees prior to or after adverse
employment action‖).
57. See Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1270–71
(1975) (describing development of the hearing requirement).
58. See, e.g., Parkin, supra note 55, at 1327–29 (describing benefits to pre-termination
benefits hearings, such as improving government accountability, allowing welfare recipients
to interact with government on a more equal footing, and promoting organizing).
59. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 80 (1972).
60. Friendly, supra note 57 at 1280–81 (citations omitted) (―It is likewise fundamental
that notice be given and that it be timely and clearly inform the individual of the proposed
action and the grounds for it. Otherwise the individual likely would be unable to marshal
evidence and prepare his case so as to benefit from any hearing that was provided.‖).
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available [through] state statutes and case law.‖61 Thus, whereas a
municipality that seizes private property must provide notice that the
seizure has occurred—―because the property owner would have no other
reasonable means of ascertaining who was responsible for his loss‖—the
municipality need not give notice of available remedies because that
information is publicly available from other sources.62 The significance of
this distinction between ignorance of facts and ignorance of law is
discussed in Part II.
As described above, procedural due process rights sometimes do qualify
as meta rights because they were developed to protect rights that themselves
arise under the Due Process Clause. One significant example arises in the
class action context,63 where many unnamed or ―absent‖ class members
have a due process right to litigate individually.64 This due process right is
in turn buttressed by a meta right: a due process right to notice of the
opportunity to opt out.
The parameters of the right to litigate individually and the meta right to
notice are established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.65 However,
Rule 23 carefully tracks the Due Process analysis, and both apply only to
class actions that seek money damages,66 where absent class members are
entitled to an opportunity to litigate individually and notice of the same. 67
That rule, as well as its constitutional grounding, flows from Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,68 in which the Court held that absent
claimants had a due process right to ―reasonably certain‖ notice of the
impending resolution of their case, which involved payouts from a common
trust fund.69 The Court stressed that the notice was linked to the due
process ―right to be heard,‖ which ―has little reality or worth unless one is
informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to
appear or default, acquiesce or contest.‖70

61. City of W. Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 241 (1999).
62. Id.
63. For ease of reference, I generally use the term ―class actions‖ to refer to all forms of
aggregate litigation accompanied by opt-out rights.
64. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). Mullane was
not itself a Rule 23 class action, but rather a proceeding to settle numerous potential claims
against a trust. Id. at 307.
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
66. Id. 23(b); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011)
(explaining that lack of notice or opportunity to opt out of class action violates due process
when the class action seeks money damages); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313 (reasoning that
absent class members are bound by the judgment or settlement in a class action, meaning
that the class action extinguishes each absent class member‘s claim, which is a potentially
valuable asset).
67. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). For class actions in which only declaratory or injunctive
relief is sought—class actions certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) or
(b)(2)—notice may be issued but is not required.
68. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
69. Id. at 315; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee‘s note of 1966 (―This
mandatory notice pursuant to subdivision (c)(2) . . . is designed to fulfill requirements of due
process to which the class action procedure is of course subject.‖).
70. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.

868

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

Similarly, the Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts71 Court stressed that
absent class members with ―claims averaging about $100 per plaintiff‖ were
entitled to notice of their right to opt out of the class and litigate
individually, even though individuals with small claims are very unlikely to
exercise that right.72 However, the Court also carefully structured the meta
rights to align with the practicalities of the case, rejecting the defendant‘s
argument that an opt-in default (a structural meta right) was required to
fully protect absent class members‘ due process rights to litigate
individually:
Requiring a plaintiff to affirmatively request inclusion would probably
impede the prosecution of those class actions involving an aggregation of
small individual claims, where a large number of claims are required to
make it economical to bring suit. The plaintiff‘s claim may be so small,
or the plaintiff so unfamiliar with the law, that he would not file suit
individually, nor would he affirmatively request inclusion in the class if
such a request were required by the Constitution. If, on the other hand, the
plaintiff‘s claim is sufficiently large or important that he wishes to litigate
it on his own, he will likely have retained an attorney or have thought
about filing suit, and should be fully capable of exercising his right to
―opt out.‖73

Thus, the Shutts Court determined that an opt-out default was appropriate
by considering the likely preferences and interests of different kinds of class
members, assuming they would act in a manner consistent with their
economic interests.74 However, the Court did not suggest that the opt-out
default was constitutionally required, and it explicitly rejected the opposite
argument, that an opt-in was constitutionally required.75 Instead, the Court
simply chose what it viewed as the best default, which presumably could
have been legislatively overridden.76
Put another way, the Court
understood that some absent class members who had not opted out had
failed to make a choice and simply waived their rights because of inertia.77
The Court nonetheless concluded that this was a constitutionally acceptable
state of affairs and, in any event, best served the likely interests of the
majority of absent class members.78 Conversely, the Court assumed that
71. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
72. Id. at 809.
73. Id. at 812–13 (citations omitted). Some commentators have criticized this rule as
failing to adequately protect the constitutional rights of litigants. See Martin H. Redish &
Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural
Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1601 (2007) (arguing that class actions implicate First
Amendment rights against compelled expression or association).
74. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812–13.
75. Id. at 812.
76. Id. at 813–14 (stating that adopting an ―opt in‖ requirement as a matter of
constitutional law would ―require the invalidation of scores of state statutes as well as
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65‖).
77. Id. at 812–13.
78. Although this Article focuses only on the meta rights associated with class actions,
other procedural protections are also in place. For example, judges must assure themselves
that the class definition is appropriate and must approve any settlement. FED. R. CIV. P.
23(a), (e).
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the absent class members who had the strongest motivation to exercise their
rights—those with large claims who might conclude that they would do
better individually than as part of a class—would take the necessary steps to
opt out and concluded that there was no constitutional barrier to requiring
them to take those steps.79
Finally, it is worth briefly considering the absence of both rights and
meta rights in class actions seeking only equitable relief. In these cases,
absent class members are neither entitled to opt out of the class nor even
guaranteed notice of the pendency of the class action, except in cases in
which the parties propose settlement.80 The Court has justified this
different treatment by reasoning that in class actions seeking monetary
judgments, class members may be better off litigating individually based on
their unique circumstances, whereas injunctive and declaratory relief is
more likely to be one-size-fits-all.81 Ironically, though, equitable class
actions are relatively likely to deal with politically charged topics about
which class members may hold different views.82 These are the class
actions that are most likely to qualify as ―expressive,‖ implicating First
Amendment rights of free speech and association in addition to petition.83
Thus, the Court‘s conclusion that absent class members are entitled to
notice only in monetary relief cases means that absent class members are
not guaranteed even the ability to attempt to influence the course of the
litigation, much less an opportunity to avoid association with a class of

79. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 813 (―[T]he Constitution does not require more to protect what
must be the somewhat rare species of class member who is unwilling to execute an ‗opt out‘
form, but whose claim is nonetheless so important that he cannot be presumed to consent to
being a member of the class by his failure to do so.‖).
80. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1); Mark C. Weber, Preclusion and Procedural Due
Process in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 347, 347–48 (1987).
81. Compare Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011) (explaining
that lack of notice or opportunity to opt out of class action violates due process when the
class action seeks money damages), with Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (reasoning that absent class members are bound by the judgment or
settlement in a class action, meaning that the class action extinguishes each absent class
member‘s claim, which is a potentially valuable asset).
82. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 505–06 (1976) (―[T]he
strongest opposition to civil rights litigation strategy may come from unnamed class
members.‖); see also Weber, supra note 80, at 353 (―Antipoverty and civil rights cases
continue to be among the most frequently filed [equitable relief] class actions.‖).
83. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963) (stating that class-based civil rights
litigation is an ―effective form of political association‖). Thus, some scholars have argued
that class membership implicates—and potentially infringes—First Amendment rights.
Redish & Larsen, supra note 73, at 1601 (―[I]n certain instances, forced association with
those who seek to pursue courses of action that the litigant finds economically, morally or
politically offensive also threatens fundamental First Amendment dictates that can similarly
be discerned from the values appropriately found to explain the procedural due process
guarantee.‖); Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority As Unity, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 565, 575 (2013) (―[I]f
the First Amendment‘s freedoms of expression and association guarantee a right of
nonassociation, then how can the government force class members to associate with each
other in a class action?‖ (citation omitted)).
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litigants seeking a potentially offensive remedy.84 This state of affairs also
contrasts significantly with some of the Court‘s holdings in the compelled
speech and subsidization context, to which the next section is devoted.
C. Rights and Meta Rights Not to Subsidize Speech
This section traces the scope of objectors‘ rights not to speak or subsidize
others‘ speech. As other scholars have shown, the Court‘s analysis of these
rights lacks a coherent theoretical justification.85 This critique is equally
applicable to the Court‘s compelled speech meta rights jurisprudence.86
This section begins with cases concerning the right not to subsidize speech
financially, where meta rights are prevalent. In contrast, meta rights to
avoid compelled speech itself are conspicuous only in their absence.
1. Labor Unions
Unionized American workplaces are generally governed by the
―exclusive representation‖ system, in which an elected union represents all
of the employees in a bargaining unit, including those who voted in favor of
representation by a different union or against unionization altogether.87
This means that each bargaining unit member is covered by the same

84. Redish & Larsen, supra note 73, at 1601–02 (discussing range of objections to class
action litigation in general and to specific suits).
85. E.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association
Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2013) (arguing
that the Court‘s compelled subsidization doctrine regarding unions cannot be reconciled with
First Amendment doctrine privileging the rights of organizations over the rights of
associated individuals); Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment Right Against
Compelled Subsidization, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2005) (―Over the years,
however, the Court has employed different standards to decide compelled subsidization
cases. And it has never settled on a single account of the doctrine‘s theoretical
underpinnings—just what First Amendment interest is threatened by compelled
subsidization.‖); Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Association, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 197–98 (arguing that ―the fundamental
premise of [compelled subsidization doctrine] is flawed‖ and that the doctrine ―cannot be
rebuilt along theoretically defensible lines until we have some better explanation of when
First Amendment review should be triggered and when it should not‖).
86. Because this Article is focused on meta rights, I discuss only those compelled speech
cases that involve an institutional speaker that seeks to compel affiliated individuals to speak
or subsidize institutional speech. This is because such cases are the only ones in which meta
rights are feasible; where it is difficult or impossible to tell in advance who might be affected
by a compulsion to speak, it would also be extremely challenging to provide advance notice
of the right to avoid compelled speech.
87. Clyde W. Summers, Exclusive Representation: A Comparative Inquiry into a
“Unique” American Principle, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL‘Y J. 47, 47 (1998) (stating that
―[t]he fundamental ordering principle which shapes American labor law and collective
bargaining is the principle of exclusive representation articulated in Section 9(a) of the
National Labor Relations Act.‖); Deborah A. Schmedemann, Of Meetings and Mailboxes:
The First Amendment and Exclusive Representation in Public Sector Labor Relations, 72
VA. L. REV. 91, 92 (1986) (―Public sector labor laws generally follow the private sector
doctrines of majority rule and exclusive representation.‖).
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collective bargaining agreement, which is negotiated and enforced by the
union.88
Bargaining, contract administration, and other union activities are costly,
raising a question about how union expenses will be shared among
bargaining unit members. In twenty-four ―right to work‖ states, the answer
to this question is straightforward because state legislatures have barred
unions from charging unwilling bargaining unit members for any of the
costs of representation.89 However, in the remaining ―fair share‖ states, the
answer is more complicated. As explained in more detail below, unions
and employers may agree that each bargaining unit member must pay part,
but not all, of the union‘s costs. Specifically, bargaining unit members can
be required to pay only for those costs that are germane to the process of
collective bargaining, but not for other costs, such as those associated with
lobbying and political advocacy.90 The chargeable portion is called an
agency fee.91
In the public sector, as well as in workplaces governed by the Railway
Labor Act,92 this arrangement raises First Amendment questions regarding
compelled subsidization of union speech. In a series of cases concerning
unionized railway and public sector workplaces,93 the Court established the
scope of government employees‘ First Amendment rights not to associate
with or fund labor unions. Additionally, the Court has created an evolving
and detailed set of meta rights designed to facilitate bargaining unit
members‘ exercise of their rights not to pay for non-germane union activity.
The key modern case establishing the parameters of public sector
bargaining unit members‘ rights to refrain from paying for certain union
88. Conversely, the union owes all bargaining unit members a duty of fair
representation. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 271 (2009) (discussing the
duty that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) imposes on a union to serve all
bargaining unit members without acting arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith).
89. See Right to Work States, NAT‘L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. FOUND., INC.,
http://www.nrtw.org/rtws.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (listing state right to work laws).
90. See Matthew T. Bodie, Labor Speech, Corporate Speech, and Political Speech:
Response to Professor Sachs, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 206, 208 (2012).
91. Gerald D. Wixted, Agency Shops & the First Amendment: A Balancing Test in Need
of Unweighted Scales, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 833, 833 (1987).
92. Though employers and unions governed by the Railway Labor Act (RLA) are
private, the Court nonetheless held that union shop contracts governed by the RLA satisfy
the First Amendment‘s state action requirement because the RLA preempts state right to
work laws. Ry. Emp. Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956) (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152
(1951)).
93. In Communications Workers of America v. Beck, the Court extended the framework
applicable to public sector and railway unions to private sector unions governed by the
NLRA as a matter of statutory construction. 487 U.S. 735, 762–63 (1988). Thus, the Beck
Court did not decide whether the conduct of private sector, NLRA-governed, unions
involves state action. Id. at 761. I do not address that question in this Article, though others
and I have critiqued it elsewhere. Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and Citizens United:
The Future of Labor Speech Rights?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 41–42 (2011) (arguing that
state action is not present in NLRA context); Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and
Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 848–50 (2012)
(critiquing the argument that state action is present in NLRA or RLA context). Thus, though
the same meta rights generally apply whether the employer is in the public or private sector,
I generally confine this Article to the public sector for ease of discussion.
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expenses, particularly union political spending, is Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education.94 Abood held that while any obligation to support a union could
―interfere in some way with an employee‘s freedom to associate,‖95
employees could nonetheless be required to pay for union expenses that are
germane to collective bargaining.96 Conversely, these employees could not
be required to fund union ―expression of political views,‖ support for
political candidates, or ―other ideological causes not germane‖ to collective
bargaining.97
The Court arrived at this formula by balancing objectors‘ First
Amendment rights to avoid unwanted speech and association against the
countervailing government interest in the stability achieved through the
exclusive representation system.98 The Court did not weigh the First
Amendment rights of unions or willing speakers in this calculus.99 The
Court emphasized the strength of the objectors‘ interest in avoiding
compelled subsidization of speech with which they disagreed, quoting
Thomas Jefferson: ―to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for
the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and
tyrannical.‖100 Yet, the Court continued, the government had an important
interest in the exclusive representation system because that system
prevents inter-union rivalries from creating dissension within the work
force and eliminating the advantages to the employee of collectivization.
It also frees the employer from the possibility of facing conflicting
demands from different unions, and permits the employer and a single
union to reach agreements and settlements that are not subject to attack
from rival labor organizations.101

Further, permitting bargaining unit members to free ride by receiving the
benefits of union representation without paying for them would threaten the
―labor peace‖-related benefits of exclusive representation, in that it could
deprive the union of resources necessary to effectively represent members,
which in turn could lead to a greater possibility of labor unrest.102
Thus, public employers and unions may agree that bargaining unit
members are required, on pain of job loss, to pay an ―agency fee‖
representing their share of union activities that are germane to the union‘s
94. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The Court recently held in Harris v. Quinn that Abood did not
apply in the context of so-called partial-public employees, although Harris did not modify
Abood‘s core holding. 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2638 (2014).
95. Abood, 431 U.S. at 222.
96. Id. at 235–36.
97. Id. at 235.
98. Id. at 220–21 (explaining that exclusive representation means that an elected union is
responsible for fairly representing all of the employees in a bargaining unit, to the exclusion
of all other bargaining representatives).
99. I have critiqued this failure elsewhere. See Garden, supra note 93, at 40–41 (arguing
that Citizens United requires courts to weigh union First Amendment rights against objector
First Amendment rights).
100. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234–35 n.31 (quoting I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE
NATIONALIST 354 (1948)).
101. Id. at 220–21.
102. Id. at 224, 221–22.

2014]

META RIGHTS

873

role as workplace representative of bargaining unit employees, particularly
collective bargaining and grievance administration.103
Later cases,
including Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n,104 defined the scope of
―germane‖ expenses in greater detail.105 In Lehnert, the union charged
represented employees who did not join the union the full amount of union
dues, reasoning that all of its activities, including political interventions
such as lobbying on issues related to the workplace, were ultimately
designed to improve the union‘s collective bargaining position.106 The
Court rejected this position in significant part, holding that, whereas unions
could require public employees to fund bargaining and grievance
administration, union conventions and other social activities, and strike
preparation, they could not charge objecting bargaining unit members for
lobbying and other political activity—except to the extent the lobbying was
designed to encourage a legislature to approve a collective bargaining
agreement—or for new organizing and the conduct of illegal strikes.107
In sum, employees who are part of a union-represented bargaining unit
cannot be required to become full dues-paying members of the union, but
they may be required to pay an agency fee. In turn, unions may use agency
fees to fund only those activities that are germane to collective bargaining.
Conversely, employees cannot be required to fund non-germane activities,
including ideological activities like lobbying and political campaigning.108
Thus, union-represented public employees in fair-share jurisdictions
generally fall into one of three categories: union members who pay the full
amount of union dues (―members‖); nonmembers who nonetheless pay the
equivalent of full union dues (―full freight‖ payers); and nonmembers who
pay the agency fee and who may prefer to pay not even that much
(―dissenters‖ or ―objectors‖). In addition, a smaller number of bargaining
unit members come to an alternate arrangement with their union. For
example, represented employees whose religious beliefs are incompatible
with payment of any money to support a union often have a statutory right
to seek an accommodation from their union, such as the chance to pay the
equivalent of union dues or the agency fee to a charity.109
103. The Abood Court recognized that many aspects of germane union activity in the
public sector implicated employees‘ First Amendment rights. Id. at 222. However, those
rights were overcome by the government interest in labor peace, as promoted by the
exclusive representation system. Id. at 222–23.
104. 500 U.S. 507 (1991) (plurality opinion).
105. Id. at 522; see also Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448–53
(1984) (holding that unions‘ relevant expenses include costs of conventions, social activities,
publication of information about germane union activities, and certain litigation, but exclude
new organizing).
106. See Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 512–13; Brief for Respondents, Lehnert, 500 U.S. 507 (No.
89-1217), 1990 WL 505709, at *28–40 (arguing that lobbying on issues such as pension
reform, education funding, length of school day, and funding for public employees was
germane to collective bargaining on behalf of public school teachers).
107. See Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 520–32.
108. Id. at 520.
109. See Reed v. Int‘l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am., 569 F.3d 576, 579 (6th Cir. 2009) (describing Title VII‘s protections for religious
bargaining unit members, which include the right to a reasonable accommodation); Katter v.
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Abood left open several questions about how dissenters would exercise
their First Amendment rights against compelled subsidization. Would there
be a default position in which bargaining unit members covered by an
agency fee agreement could pay full freight and opt out of paying for the
union‘s non-germane speech, or would the default be to pay just the agency
fee? Will members be notified of their rights not to pay, and if so, how,
when, and by whom? Through what procedural mechanism will members
exercise their rights not to pay? What recourse will be available to
members who are dissatisfied with the calculation of the agency fee? The
Court later answered these questions about meta rights in a series of cases,
of which Knox v. Service Employees International Union Local 1000110 is
the most recent.
To begin, the Court rejected a ―pure rebate approach,‖ reasoning that
―[g]iven the existence of acceptable alternatives, the union cannot be
allowed to commit dissenters‘ funds to improper uses even temporarily.‖111
Accordingly, unions wanting to charge dissenters an agency fee had to
develop a procedure to determine in advance the percentage of dues they
would likely spend on non-chargeable expenses, and deduct that amount in
advance from the fees to be paid by objectors.112 The Court evaluated one
such procedure in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,113 answering many
of the questions that remained following Abood.114
The objectors in Hudson were bargaining unit members who deemed
inadequate the union‘s procedure for allowing objectors to exercise their
Abood rights.115 Under that procedure, the union first assessed the
―proportionate share‖ of union dues that were to be devoted to chargeable
activities, and began automatically deducting that amount from objectors‘
paychecks.116 Objectors seeking to challenge the union‘s calculation then
had to write to the union president within thirty days of the first
deduction.117 That letter triggered a three-step appeal procedure that
culminated with arbitration; ―[i]f an objection was sustained at any stage of
the procedure, the remedy would be an immediate reduction in the amount
of future deductions for all nonmembers and a rebate for the objector.‖118
The Hudson objectors successfully challenged this procedure as
inadequate to protect their First Amendment rights to avoid compelled
Ohio Emp‘t Relations Bd., 492 F. Supp. 2d 851, 864 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (holding that a public
sector employee was entitled to religious accommodation under either Ohio law or Title VII
of the federal Civil Rights Act).
110. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
111. Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 443–44 (1984). In a ―pure
rebate approach,‖ the union charges objectors the full freight amount but then periodically
refunds to objectors the fraction of total dues payments spent on non-chargeable expenses
during the previous period. Id. at 443–44.
112. Id.
113. 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
114. Id. at 305–06.
115. Id. at 294.
116. Id. at 295.
117. Id. at 296.
118. Id.
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support of non-chargeable union activities, including the right to avoid
payment followed by a rebate.119 In addition to offering an explanation—
albeit a brief one—for imposing procedural safeguards at all,120 the Court
adopted a trio of notice and structural meta rights to protect dissenters,121
concluding that the First Amendment required them to do so—creating a
true meta right.
The Hudson safeguards are as follows. First, unions must annually notify
bargaining unit members of their opt-out rights via a document now called a
Hudson notice.122 This notice must include ―sufficient information to
gauge the propriety of the union‘s fee,‖ which is calculated based on the
union‘s spending during the previous year.123 In addition, unions must
provide ―a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the
fee before an impartial decisionmaker,‖ and hold any amount of the
objector‘s fee that is ―reasonably in dispute‖ in escrow while the challenge
is pending.124 The Court explained that these procedures were designed to
prevent unions from even temporarily using dissenters‘ money for nonchargeable ideological expenses.125 Finally, the Court did not revise its
earlier conclusion that the opt-out default (meaning that nonmembers pay
full freight unless they affirmatively indicate their willingness to do so) was
adequate; the Court reiterated that ―dissent is not to be presumed—it must
affirmatively be made known to the union by the dissenting employee.‖126
In two subsequent cases, the Court held that these procedures are only a
floor, and that states are free to take other steps to protect or even encourage
workers not to pay full freight. First, in Davenport v. Washington
Education Ass’n,127 the Court upheld the Washington State‘s opt-in
statutory regime, under which labor unions were prohibited ―from using the
agency-shop fees of a nonmember for election-related purposes unless the
nonmember affirmatively consents.‖128 The Court reasoned that Hudson
was merely a floor below which protections for objectors could not fall, and
further, although ―courts have an obligation to interfere with a union‘s
statutory entitlement no more than is necessary to vindicate the rights of
nonmembers,‖ ―legislatures (or voters) themselves‖ could do more to
protect nonmembers.129 In other words, because state legislatures may
refuse to allow public sector bargaining at all, or they may allow bargaining
119. Id. at 303–04.
120. This reasoning is analyzed in Part II.
121. Hudson, 475 U.S. at 310.
122. Id. at 306; Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int‘l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2291–92
(2012) (describing annual Hudson notice procedure).
123. Hudson, 475 U.S. at 406.
124. Id. at 309–10.
125. Id. at 305–06 (holding that the union could not make ―forced exaction followed by a
rebate‖).
126. Id. at 306 n.16 (quoting Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 119 (1963)
(adopting opt-out default in Railway Labor Act context)); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 238 (1977) (relying on Allen in public sector context).
127. 551 U.S. 177 (2007).
128. Id. at 180.
129. Id. at 186.
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but bar unions from collecting any fees from unwilling nonmembers, they
may also take the lesser step of allowing agency fees, but making it more
difficult for unions to collect them.130 Two years later, in Ysursa v.
Pocatello Education Ass’n,131 the Court upheld an Idaho statute eliminating
automatic payroll deduction (check off) of money intended to fund union
political activities.132 The Court reasoned that the government was ―not
required to assist others in funding the expression of particular ideas,
including political ones,‖ and that check off qualified as government
assistance.133
These cases formed the applicable legal landscape until Knox called into
question the continuing validity of much of the Hudson framework. Knox
arose following a California local union‘s decision to levy a midyear dues
increase to establish a ―Political Fight Back Fund,‖ ostensibly to fight two
antiunion public ballot initiatives.134 That name turned out to be both
inaccurate and infelicitous—the union ultimately spent the extra money on
representational activities rather than political campaigning, but the Court
rejected the idea that a ―political fight-back-fund‖ could have in fact funded
nonpolitical speech.135 In levying the increase, the union neither issued a
supplemental Hudson notice nor allowed a new opportunity to opt out,
though it did honor previous opt-outs. In response, dissenting bargaining
unit members sued, raising two issues: a rights question about whether the
union‘s lobbying was chargeable, and a meta rights question about whether
the union was required to issue a new Hudson notice before imposing a
midyear dues increase.
The Knox Court primarily addressed the meta rights question, actually
going further than the plaintiffs asked, and holding that the opt-out regime
was not sufficiently protective of the First Amendment interests of
dissenters.136 Instead, the Court held that an opt-in regime was required.137
To reach this conclusion, the Court focused on bargaining unit members
who had not joined the union, yet paid full freight—a combination that the
Court viewed as explicable only in terms of a massive failure of Hudson‘s
meta rights regime to protect dissenters.138 Significantly, in its discussion
of these employees, the Court equated the opt-out default itself with

130. Id. at 184.
131. 555 U.S. 353 (2009).
132. Id. at 355–56.
133. Id. at 358.
134. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int‘l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2285 (2012).
135. Id. at 2293.
136. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 85, at 1043. The Knox dissenters and scholars
have criticized the Court‘s activist decision to go beyond the question presented and adopt an
opt-in regime. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2297–98 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 2306 (Breyer,
J., dissenting); Martin H. Malin, Does Public Employee Collective Bargaining Distort
Democracy? A Perspective from the United States, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL‘Y J. 277, 299
(2013).
137. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2291.
138. The reliability of this conclusion is critiqued in Part II.C.2.
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―acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.‖139 Thus, contrary to
Abood (as well as cases like Shutts), which emphasized that the
Constitution was not implicated by the fact that dissenters had to take action
in order to opt out of a default, the Knox Court concluded not that fullfreight payers had slept on their rights, but instead that their rights had been
violated.140 However, assuming one accepts this premise, funding political
speech and declining to fund that speech are equally exercises of First
Amendment rights141—meaning that the Court‘s equation is plausible only
if it is correct that it is ―likely that most employees who choose not to join
the union that represents their bargaining unit prefer not to pay the full
amount of union dues.‖142 If instead the opposite is true, then Knox‘s
premise that speech defaults or barriers themselves violate the First
Amendment calls into question not just Knox itself but also Ysursa and
Davenport.
Finally, while Knox was limited to midyear dues increases, it is unclear
why the Court‘s reasoning would not apply equally to any union dues
assessment—the Court suggested no reason that the First Amendment rights
of dissenters are heightened in the middle of the dues year. Given this, one
can expect to see objectors with an eye toward Supreme Court review to
begin to invite courts to reconsider whether Hudson procedures are
adequate to protect dissenters.143
First Amendment rights to avoid compelled subsidization are more
robustly developed in the union context than in any other context raising
compelled speech or subsidization issues. However, meta rights also exist
in the context of bar associations and—more obliquely—compelled
agricultural advertising schemes. These contexts are discussed in the next
two sections.
2. Bar Associations
Whether attorneys have a First Amendment right to opt out of mandatory
bar dues, either in whole or in part, is a question with close parallels to the
union context. Indeed, the Court‘s limited case law in this area (consisting
of two cases, the second of which overturned the first) largely tracks Abood,
139. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2290 (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999)).
140. Thus, the Court expressed concern for employees who lacked strong political views:
―Nor did we [in previous cases] explore the extent of First Amendment protection for
employees who might not qualify as active ‗dissenters‘ but who would nonetheless prefer to
keep their own money rather than subsidizing by default the political agenda of a statefavored union.‖ Id. at 2290. The Court appeared to understand these employees as having
rationally decided that completing the Hudson process was not worth their time, considering
the weakness of their preferences not to pay full freight. Yet, the Court concluded that the
First Amendment demanded protection for these employees too. Id.
141. Joseph Blocher, Rights to and Not to, 100 CAL. L. REV. 761, 795–97 (2012) (tracing
the development of the First Amendment right not to speak).
142. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2290.
143. At least one such case is currently pending. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass‘n, No.
8:13-cv-00676-JLW-CW
(C.D.
Cal.
2013),
available
at
http://www.cirusa.org/legal_docs/friedrichs_v_cta_dc_dec_pldg.pdf.
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though the nuances of the law governing mandatory bar association dues
are less developed. The leading case is Keller v. State Bar of California,144
in which the Court held that attorneys were entitled to a partial opt-out from
California‘s integrated bar association. As in Abood, the Court held that the
state bar‘s functions were important enough to justify limited compelled
association and, in turn, to compel objectors to pay for germane
expenditures—here, those ―necessarily or reasonably incurred for the
purpose of regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of the
legal service available to the people of the State.‖145 However, the Court
declined to reach the meta rights question of what procedures were required
in order to protect objectors, citing the underdeveloped record on that
issue.146
Since Keller, only a handful of courts have addressed that question.
They have generally held that Hudson‘s procedures are applicable in the bar
dues context,147 though some courts read Hudson quite loosely. For
example, the Eleventh Circuit cited Hudson and upheld the Florida Bar‘s
procedure for complying with Keller even though it differed in significant
ways from the procedures required in Hudson.148 Specifically, the bar
association required dissenters to object on an issue-by-issue basis, and then
offered a rebate (with interest) of the dues spent on lobbying on particular
issues149—essentially, the ―pure rebate‖ approach forbidden by Abood and
Hudson. Further, while the Florida Bar provided notice via a bar newsletter
of the various political positions on which it lobbied, it did not issue
individualized notice to each member on either of those issues or the
member‘s right to object.150 Nonetheless, the Court held that the
procedures were adequate, with the sole caveat that Florida was required to
calculate interest on refunded dues based on the date that the Bar took the
contested position, rather than the date it received notice of a member‘s
objection.151 This conclusion stands in tension with Hudson, in which the
Court rejected similar procedures.152
Other state bar associations have procedures that plainly fall short of
Hudson‘s strictures.153 However, few have been challenged in court. One

144. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
145. Id. at 14 (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 447
(1984)). In contrast, objectors could not be compelled to pay for the bar associations‘
activities that were unrelated to those goals, such as filing amicus briefs in cases presenting
issues unrelated to the regulation of the legal profession.
146. Id. at 17.
147. E.g., Romero v. Colegio De Abogados De P.R., 204 F.3d 291, 304 (1st Cir. 2000)
(rejecting rebate plus interest approach because that approach was inconsistent with
Hudson).
148. Gibson v. Fla. Bar, 906 F.2d 624, 630 (11th Cir. 1990); see also The Florida Bar re
Frankel, 581 So. 2d 1294, 1299 (Fla. 1991) (adopting the rationale in Gibson).
149. Gibson, 906 F.2d at 628–29.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 631–32.
152. See supra Part I.C.1.
153. For example, the District of Columbia bar rules list various membership classes and
associated dues amounts with no mention of the possibility of objecting to a portion of bar
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reason for this may be that bar associations‘ lobbying and other political
interventions are less obvious than unions‘, sparking less ire from unwilling
bar members. Alternatively, it may be that attorneys who object to bar
associations‘ political spending prefer to contend with relatively obscure
procedures than to commence expensive litigation aimed at securing
stronger meta rights for all. Whatever the reason, though, opting out of bar
associations‘ non-chargeable spending is often a more complicated
proposition than taking the equivalent steps in the union context.
3. Generic Advertising
The Court has addressed compelled subsidization of generic advertising
schemes administered by private industry trade groups three times; the
outcome in two of those cases turned on the scope of individual producers‘
rights to avoid compelled subsidization of speech.154 In each, an
agricultural producer objected on First Amendment grounds to the
compelled subsidization of advertising that did not refer to any particular
producer, but instead simply touted the benefits of a product—asserting, for
example, ―beef, it‘s what‘s for dinner.‖ Although the compelled subsidies
in the cases were essentially identical from the advertisers‘ perspectives, the
structure of the two programs resulted in two five-to-four decisions pointing
in opposite directions. Further, in each case, the majority asserted that it
was correctly applying Abood and Keller, with the dissent arguing the
contrary.155
First, in Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.,156 the Court
addressed whether producers could be compelled to contribute to a
―California Summer Fruits‖ advertising scheme. That scheme was a small
part of a set of economic regulations, promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture, designed to regularize the price and quality of fruit and protect
farmers‘ incomes.157 The Glickman plaintiffs articulated a range of
objections to the advertisements, including that they considered some
aspects of the ads (such as the claim that ―red colored fruit is superior‖) to
be untrue, that they felt the ads promoted ―the ‗socialistic programs‘ of the
Secretary,‖ and that they felt the ads promoted ―sexually subliminal
messages.‖158 However, the district court doubted whether these objections
were sincere.159
dues under Keller. Rules and Bylaws, D.C. BAR, http://www.dcbar.org/about-the-bar/rulesand-bylaws/rule-02.cfm (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
154. In the third case, Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, the Court held that a similar
advertising scheme was government speech, rather than speech of a private group. 544 U.S.
550, 559 (2005). Because the government is entitled to espouse particular views, the
advertising program did not violate the First Amendment. Id.
155. See generally United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001); Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
156. 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
157. Id. at 461. The Glickman plaintiffs objected not just to the compelled advertising
subsidy but also to various rules against selling small or immature fruit.
158. Id. at 467 n.10.
159. Id. at 467.
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Like in Abood and Keller, the Court found it significant that the
compelled subsidy was ―part of a broader collective enterprise in which [the
plaintiff‘s] freedom to act independently is already constrained by the
regulatory scheme.‖160 Thus, as in those cases, compelled subsidization of
speech could be justified by the presence of an important, broader scheme,
of which the compelled subsidization was a necessary part. However, the
Glickman Court then went further, holding that compelled advertising did
not even implicate the First Amendment. In particular, the Court relied on
three aspects of the advertising scheme. First, ―the marketing orders
impose[d] no restraint on the freedom of any producer to communicate any
message to any audience,‖161 meaning that the producers were free to
convey any message they chose—even, for example, that red fruits were not
superior—through their own advertising. Second, the compulsion was
merely a subsidy, which ―[did] not compel any person to engage in any
actual or symbolic speech.‖162
Finally, the Court held that the
advertisements ―do not compel the producers to endorse or to finance any
political or ideological views.‖163 Here, the Court flatly rejected the
argument that compelled subsidy of speech always implicates the First
Amendment, regardless of the content of the speech: ―[R]equiring
respondents to pay the assessments cannot be said to engender any crisis of
conscience. . . . The mere fact that objectors believe their money is not
being well spent ‗does not mean [that] they have a First Amendment
complaint.‘‖164
The Court took a dramatically different approach just four years later in
United States v. United Foods,165 striking down a compelled subsidy for
generic mushroom advertising. For the United Foods Court, the key feature
that distinguished the mushroom advertising scheme from the fruit
advertisements in Glickman was the absence of a comprehensive scheme of
collective economic regulation, as were present in Abood and Keller.166
Thus, the compelled subsidization could not be justified based on its
necessary role in an important broader program. Importantly, though, the
majority also characterized the objection at issue very differently. Unlike
the Glickman Court‘s assessment that a producer‘s desire not to fund
160. Id. at 469.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 469–70.
164. Id. at 472 (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 456
(1984)).
165. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
United Foods did not overrule Glickman, instead
distinguishing it based on the presence of a larger scheme of economic regulation in
Glickman. Id. at 414–15. That distinction has been criticized by many, but not all,
commentators. E.g., Seana Shiffrin, Compelled Association, Morality, and Market
Dynamics, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 321 (2007). The two cases took radically different
approaches to describing the relevant objections: as disagreement with business strategy in
Glickman and disagreement with speech imbued with First Amendment value in United
Foods. United Foods, 553 U.S. at 405; Glickman, 521 U.S. at 470.
166. United Foods, 553 U.S. at 413 (―[I]t is only the overriding associational purpose
which allows any compelled subsidy for speech in the first place.‖).
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advertising is fundamentally an economic objection—a mere desire not to
pay—the United Foods Court considered the producer-plaintiff to be
―object[ing] to the idea being advanced.‖167 Accordingly, the Court
characterized the producer‘s objection in terms of core First Amendment
values: ―[T]here is no apparent [First Amendment] principle distinguishing
out of hand minor debates about whether a branded mushroom is better than
just any mushroom.‖168 The negative implication of this statement is that
the United Foods holding—that compelled subsidization is acceptable
where it is part of a broader scheme of collective economic regulation—
applies to subsidization of even political speech.
Finally, unlike Glickman, where there was no meta rights question
because the Court found no First Amendment rights were at stake, United
Foods at least theoretically presented such a question. After all, there was
only one plaintiff in United Foods, suggesting that other mushroom growers
were willing payers, or at least that they had not objected so strongly as to
file a lawsuit. Thus, the Court could have held that United Foods had a
right to opt out of the mandatory assessment, and then moved on to
consider whether and how other producers‘ rights to opt out would be
protected through notice and other structural procedures.
However, the Court instead simply declared that ―the assessments are not
permitted under the First Amendment.‖169 Even though this formulation
was not the result of conscious consideration of the meta rights question, it
is telling that the Court chose not to articulate its holding in terms of
whether producers could be compelled to pay, focusing instead on the
assessment itself. In effect, the Court‘s holding was tantamount to creating
an opt-in default, in which producers that still wanted to fund generic
advertising would have to affirmatively choose to get together and share the
costs of advertising.
D. Rights and Meta Rights Not to Speak or Associate
In addition to the compelled subsidization cases described above, the
Court has also confronted compelled speech and association directly in a
handful of cases. While the Knox Court conflated compelled speech with
compelled subsidization170—a move that was perhaps unsurprising
following the Court‘s treatment of spending as equivalent to speech in cases
like Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,171 as well as in

167. Id. at 410.
168. Id. at 411.
169. Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
170. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int‘l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2289 (2012) (stating
that ―compulsory fees constitute a form of compelled speech and association‖).
171. 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also Deborah Hellman, Money Talks but It Isn’t Speech, 95
MINN. L. REV. 953, 994–95 (2011) (observing that the Citizens United Court ―considered it
so obvious that restrictions on spending money amount to restrictions on speech that it
needed no discussion at all, not even a citation to Buckley [v. Valeo]‖).
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United Foods172—commentators and earlier cases draw a distinction
between the two, emphasizing that compelled speech was more serious than
compelled subsidization.173 Yet, no court has ever held that meta rights are
required to protect First Amendment rights against compelled speech itself.
1. Public Education
In the well-known early case Pierce v. Society of Sisters,174 the Court
held that parents have a Fourteenth Amendment right to choose private
school over public school for their children, though states could impose
reasonable requirements on private schools to ensure that students were
properly prepared for the requirements of citizenship.175 The Court went
further in Wisconsin v. Yoder,176 holding that Amish children and parents
(though not necessarily other children and parents) had a First Amendment
right to be excused from mandatory schooling altogether.177 Thus, parents
may choose private school over public school for any reason, and parents
may opt out of secondary schooling for their child altogether at least where
school poses an existential threat to a religious group with a track record of
appropriately caring for its members. However, these opt-out rights are not
accompanied by any notice or procedural protections designed to ensure
that parents are aware of their First Amendment rights.178 (Nor may
taxpayers opt out of subsidizing schools or other programs that express
messages with which they disagree.179)

172. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 511; see also Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the CompelledCommercial-Speech Conundrum, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL‘Y & L. 205, 226 (2011) (observing that
the United Foods Court cited compelled speech cases in support of its conclusion).
173. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 239–40 (2000) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (stating that compelled speech cases raise more serious concerns than the
compelled subsidy issue presented in Southworth); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot,
Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 470–71 (1997) (holding that compelled speech cases were ―clearly
inapplicable‖ in compelled subsidization context); Bodie, supra note 90, at 213 n.51; Sachs,
supra note 93, at 857–58 (distinguishing between compelled speech and compelled
subsidization and noting that the ―the line between these two categories is not a clean one‖);
cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan & Robert C. Post, It’s What’s for Lunch: Nectarines, Mushrooms,
and Beef—The First Amendment and Compelled Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 359, 370
(2007) (―[T]he only reason that compelled subsidization of speech can possibly raise a
constitutional question is that it may be regarded as a form of compelled speech.‖).
174. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
175. Id. at 534–35.
176. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
177. Id. at 222.
178. This is not to say that parents do not become aware of their rights to homeschool
from other sources. To the contrary, the idea of a ―right to homeschool‖ has gained
popularity in recent years, due in part to the activities of advocacy groups. Robin L. West,
Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 713,
732–34 (2011) (documenting how the idea of right to homeschool has ―gained considerable
support in lower courts, state legislatures, and among some segments of the public‖). In
Part II, I discuss the significance of the availability of ―outside‖ information about rights to
the development of meta rights.
179. See generally United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). Some scholars have
convincingly critiqued the Court‘s distinction between compelled subsidization of speech in
the tax context, where objectors may not opt out, and other contexts. E.g., Post, supra note
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Relatedly, courts have addressed questions pertaining to parents‘ and
students‘ desires to attend public school but opt out of certain aspects of the
curriculum. In particular, the Supreme Court has twice addressed whether
students may be compelled to say the Pledge of Allegiance as a condition of
attending public school. Notoriously, the Court in Minersville School
District v. Gobitis180 held that students belonging to the Jehovah‘s Witness
faith had no First Amendment right to opt out of reciting the Pledge of
Allegiance, forcing those students to choose between their faiths and public
school attendance. The Court relied primarily on the government‘s interest
in ―the promotion of national cohesion,‖ stating that ―[n]ational unity is the
basis of national security.‖181 However, the Court also relied in part on
religious parents‘ rights to enroll their children in private school,182
implying that the opportunity to opt out completely (however illusory,
given the cost of private or religious schools) made the lack of a partial optout right constitutionally acceptable.
The Court reversed Gobitis just three years later in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette,183 holding for the first time that the First
Amendment encompasses a right against compelled speech.184 Though the
Barnette plaintiffs, like the Gobitis plaintiffs, had religious objections to
reciting the Pledge, the Court did not limit its holding to the religious.
However, it did explain its holding in terms of convictions: ―We can have
intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to
exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal
attitudes . . . freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much.‖185 Accordingly, Barnette rejected the power of states to protect
national unity by ―expel[ling] a handful of children from school‖ for
refusing to say the Pledge.186
Courts following Barnette have been reluctant to allow students attending
public school to opt out of other portions of the curriculum, particularly
when the objection is not motivated by religious belief.187 Moreover,
courts have not imposed any obligation on schools to inform students or
parents of their Barnette rights, despite the fact that teachers routinely lead
students in saying the Pledge of Allegiance, and evidence that at least some
schools still punish students who decline to say the Pledge.188 Yet, even

85, at 196 (arguing that the reasoning of United Foods, if taken to its logical extreme, would
mean that courts must review the use of taxes to fund government speech).
180. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
181. Id. at 595.
182. Id. at 599 (citing Pierce v. Soc‘y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
183. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
184. Id. at 633–34.
185. Id. at 641–42.
186. Id. at 636.
187. Noa Ben-Asher, The Lawmaking Family, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 363, 386–87 (2012).
188. Martin Guggenheim, Stealth Indoctrination: Forced Speech in the Classroom, 2004
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 72–73 (discussing prevalence of teacher-led recitation of the Pledge,
and lack of student knowledge about Barnette rights); Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of
Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 469 (1995) (discussing constitutionality of
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where Barnette rights have been violated, decision makers tailor remedies
much more narrowly. When these violations are rooted in statutes requiring
Pledge recitation, attorneys ask courts to strike down the statutes.189
Conversely, many cases arising from idiosyncratic decisions by teachers or
school districts are resolved via a sternly worded letter to the superintendent
from an ACLU attorney.190 Where that strategy is unsuccessful, students
and parents may file suit, but they typically limit their demands for
injunctive relief to an order preventing school district officials from
punishing students who do not say the Pledge.191 And, while a handful of
civil libertarians have advocated for legislative or regulatory reform
requiring school officials to inform students of their Barnette rights, such
efforts have yet to yield results.192
2. License Plates
The Court also found compelled speech in Wooley v. Maynard,193 and on
that basis struck down a criminal conviction for violating New Hampshire‘s
requirement that drivers display the state motto ―Live Free or Die‖ on their
license plates. Maynard had repeatedly either covered the motto with tape
or cut part of it out of his plates because the motto conflicted with his
religious faith.194
teacher-led recitations of the Pledge); see also supra notes 154, 165 (cases finding violations
of Barnette rights).
189. Circle Sch. v. Pappert, 381 F.3d 172, 181–83 (3d Cir. 2004) (striking down state
statute requiring parental notification when students declined to say the Pledge and holding
that statute requiring private school personnel to lead students in the Pledge was
unconstitutional); Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir.
1992) (concluding that Illinois statute did not on its face compel students to recite the Pledge
and noting absence of record evidence about whether schools in fact required all students to
say the Pledge); Lane v. Owens, No. 03-B-1544 (D. Colo. Aug. 15, 2003), available at
http://static.aclu-co.org/wp-content/uploads/files/200309_309pledge_Courts_Oral_
Ruling_8-15-03.pdf (order granting temporary injunction against operation of statute
permitting only students with religious objections from foregoing Pledge recitation).
190. Emily Garber, Students Not Required to Participate in the Pledge of Allegiance,
ACLU,
http://aclu-or.org/blog/students-not-required-participate-pledge-allegiance
(discussing ACLU attorney‘s efforts to stop compelled Pledge recitation in an Oregon
elementary school) (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); Dotty Griffith, ACLU of Texas Protects
Students First Amendment Rights; Sweeny School Officials Must Change Unconstitutional
Policy, ACLU (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.aclutx.org/2011/04/14/aclu-of-texas-protectsstudents%E2%80%99-first-amendment-rights-sweeney-school-officials-must-changeunconstitutional-policy/ (discussing ACLU challenge to Texas school district requirement
that students stand during Pledge).
191. E.g., Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1268–69 (11th Cir.
2004) (finding genuine issue of fact as to whether school punished student for failing to
recite Pledge; student sought compensatory and declaratory relief); Rabideau v.
Beekmantown Cent. Sch. Dist., 89 F. Supp. 2d. 263, 268 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying
summary judgment for the district based on record evidence suggesting student was
punished for refusing to participate in Pledge).
192. Pledge of Confusion? Schools Wrestle with Flag Policy in Classroom, FOX NEWS
(Sept. 15, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2009/09/15/pledge-confusion-schoolswrestle-with-flag-policy-in-classroom/.
193. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
194. Id. at 707–08.
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The Court first held that the license plate requirement constituted
compelled speech because it ―force[d] an individual, as part of his daily
life . . . to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological
point of view he finds unacceptable.‖195 Then, the Court applied the
compelled speech principles announced in Barnette. Overturning the
conviction, the Court stated that ―[a] system which secures the right to
proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee
the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right to speak
and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of
the broader concept of ‗individual freedom of mind.‘‖196 Further, the Court
rejected the State‘s attempt to justify the license plate requirement based on
either its interest in identifying cars, or its desire ―to communicate to others
an official view as to proper appreciation of history, state pride, and
individualism.‖197
In overturning the convictions, the Court held that New Hampshire ―may
not require appellees to display the state motto upon their vehicle license
plates,‖ and affirmed an injunction entered by the district court.198 That
injunction prevented New Hampshire officials from arresting or prosecuting
the Maynards for covering the state motto.199 However, the district court
refused the additional relief sought by the Maynards: an injunction
requiring New Hampshire to issue new license plates not containing the
motto.200 Thus, the Maynards could be assured that they would not be
convicted of a crime for covering the state motto with tape, but were
nonetheless required to take that affirmative step in order to avoid unwanted
expression.
Neither the district court nor the Supreme Court held that the case
demanded any notice or structural protections. Moreover, the statute
requiring ―Live Free or Die‖ to be written on all New Hampshire passenger
vehicle license plates remains on the books, and it is still a criminal offense
to obscure the ―figures or letters‖ on any plate.201 Of course, anyone who
obscures the state motto for religious or political reasons would have a good
First Amendment defense to criminal charges (or could raise the issue
affirmatively in a declaratory judgment action). However, a political or
religious objector who is aware of state law (perhaps having been informed
by a clerk at the DMV or a state trooper) but not the Maynard decision may
be unwilling to risk prosecution in order to avoid displaying the motto.
195. Id. at 715. The Court observed that the infringement in Wooley was less severe than
that of Barnette because displaying a license plate is a ―passive act,‖ but described the
difference between the two cases as ―essentially one of degree.‖ Id.
196. Id. at 714 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
197. Id. at 717.
198. Id.
199. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1389 (D.N.H. 1976).
200. Id. (observing that ―New Hampshire could easily issue plaintiffs license plates that
do not contain the motto,‖ but declining to issue the injunction because ―[t]he relief we have
ordered should fully protect plaintiffs in the exercise of their First Amendment rights, and
we would be ill-advised to interfere further with the operation of New Hampshire‘s system
of vehicle identification‖).
201. N.H. REV. STAT. §§ 261:75, :176 (2014).
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This part has defined meta rights and traced their development in a range
of contexts. The next part turns to the normative questions of when meta
rights are called for and how they should be structured. It argues for the
importation of the self-help principle from the Miranda and class action
contexts to the compelled speech and subsidization context, and then
considers the availability of self-help in various compelled speech and
subsidization contexts. Then, it argues that, in structuring meta rights in the
compelled speech and subsidization contexts, courts must consider the
potential speech-discouraging effects of particular types of meta rights.
II. RATIONALIZING META RIGHTS
There are many convincing criticisms of the Court‘s approach to rights
against compelled speech and subsidization. For example, Robert Post
observes that much compelled speech and subsidization does not trigger
First Amendment scrutiny at all, even where it seems to present equal or
more serious concerns than those in cases like United Foods.202 Catherine
Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky have argued convincingly that the Court‘s
compelled speech and subsidization cases reflect reluctance to empower
union leaders, relative to leaders of other groups, to take positions that
conflict with the group‘s membership.203 Others have shown that, even
leaving aside inconsistencies between cases, the Court‘s reasoning is often
flimsy; for example, the Court has not offered a persuasive explanation for
why the requirement that one display a license plate with a controversial
state motto on it equates to compelled speech by drivers, given that anyone
viewing the message would be nearly certain to understand the message to
be that of the state, not of the individual.204
While I agree with many of these critiques, I turn here to the separate
issue of the Court‘s approach to meta rights in these cases. The Court has
never convincingly explained why, when, and to what extent constitutional
meta rights are required at all; rather, meta rights have developed on a
largely ad hoc basis. Further, when meta rights are called for, it is not clear
why simple notice of the right to opt out is sometimes insufficient, as the
Court held in Knox and United Foods.205
One way to shape meta rights in the compelled speech and subsidization
context would be to simply determine how dissenters could be protected to
the maximum extent possible. However, the Court has implicitly rejected
this approach, and it has held in many other contexts that speakers may be
required to take action—and even to overcome genuine barriers—in order
202. Post, supra note 85, at 210 (noting that many instances in which government
compels speech or subsidization, such as when a litigant must pay the other side‘s attorneys‘
fees, do not violate the First Amendment, despite their similarity to speech in which the
Court has found a First Amendment violation).
203. See generally Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 85.
204. Greene, supra note 188, at 473–74; cf. Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in
Compelled Speech Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 370 (2008) (arguing that there is a First
Amendment right against compelled speech that listeners would not attribute to speaker). See
generally Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147 (2006).
205. See supra Part I.C.
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to speak or avoid speech.206 For example, cities may require parade
organizers to pay money to obtain required permits well in advance of a
parade.207 Similarly, they may require speakers to learn about and comply
with time, place, and manner restrictions on their speech, even when doing
so involves transaction costs.208 Likewise, Citizens United rejected
shareholder protection as a compelling state interest in limiting corporate
political spending because shareholders could engage in corporate
democracy or sell their shares to avoid funding unwanted corporate political
speech.209 In other words, the Constitution does not require the elimination
of all disincentives to speak or not speak, and it does not matter whether the
source of those disincentives is the government, an associational speaker
itself, or unrelated individuals. A fortiori, then, there is a good argument
that the fact that a potential dissenter must make his or her preferences
known, as in the union or class action context, does not implicate the First
Amendment at all.
Further, some meta rights impose significant burdens on the institutions
calling for speech or subsidization, as well as their constituents who wish to
speak in concert.210 For example, the Hudson procedure imposes
significant costs on unions that both engage in political advocacy and
charge bargaining unit members for the costs of representation.211 Yet, the
Court fails to account for the rights of willing speakers—both institutions
and members—in its analysis. Thus, to the extent meta rights are
appropriate in the First Amendment context, a more nuanced approach to
structuring them is needed.
This part proceeds from the premise—evident in the Court‘s own
holdings—that meta rights are not called for as a matter of course in the
compelled speech and subsidization arena. The first question, then, is
whether there is a principle or set of principles according to which courts
can determine whether meta rights are necessary. The compelled speech
and subsidization cases do not themselves contain a coherent justification
for meta rights. However, as discussed in Part I, the Court has elsewhere
called for meta rights when individuals cannot invoke their rights through
self-help alone. I argue that this principle is sound and could likewise
206. The First Amendment is not unique here—the Court has permitted government to
erect barriers to the exercise of constitutional rights in other areas of law. As described
previously, supra note 26, courts explicitly discourage criminal defendants from exercising
their Faretta rights—an anti-meta right. Further, the Court has permitted government actors
to discourage individuals from invoking some constitutional rights without requiring any
counterbalancing meta rights. See e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 874 (1992) (allowing states to discourage women from choosing abortion, providing
they do not unduly burden women‘s exercise of their abortion rights).
207. Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (holding permit
requirements constitutional in order to ―regulate competing uses of public forums‖ provided
certain additional requirements are satisfied).
208. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 812 (1989).
209. Citizens United v. FEC, 588 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010).
210. See infra Part II.C.
211. As I have argued elsewhere, these requirements are analogous to the procedures that
the Court struck down in Citizens United because they imposed too great a burden on
corporate and union political speech. Garden, supra note 93, at 43.
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prove useful in deciding meta rights questions in the compelled speech
context.
This part concludes by discussing the form that meta rights should take.
Here, I take as my starting point the Court‘s premise in Knox that an opt-out
requirement can itself violate the First Amendment if it results in bargaining
unit members subsidizing union political speech, either because of inertia,
or because the speech default itself affects their decision about whether to
subsidize speech. Accordingly, this discussion proceeds on the assumption
that speech defaults implicate the First Amendment. While that legal
conclusion is itself contestable (as noted above), it is nonetheless worth
playing out its consequences. These include the possibility that under
Knox‘s First Amendment premises, an opt-in default is, if anything, more
problematic than an opt-out default.
A. Meta Rights and the Self-Help Principle
Why should meta rights guard against some—but not all—compelled
speech and subsidization? Is there a justification for treating union
members and lawyers differently from, say, public school children who
may wish to opt out of the Pledge of Allegiance, and for protecting food
producers most of all?
The Court‘s own answer to these questions is thin at best. Unlike in
Miranda, where the Court offered a robust explanation of why notice rights
were necessary in the custodial interrogation context,212 the Court‘s
compelled speech and subsidization cases offer little explanation of why
meta rights are (or are not) provided. For example, the Hudson Court
offered the following explanation for the development of meta rights in the
union context:
Procedural safeguards are necessary . . . for two reasons. First, although
the government interest in labor peace is strong enough to support an
―agency shop‖ notwithstanding its limited infringement on nonunion
employees‘ constitutional rights, the fact that those rights are protected by
the First Amendment requires that the procedure be carefully tailored to
minimize the infringement. Second, the nonunion employee—the
individual whose First Amendment rights are being affected—must have
a fair opportunity to identify the impact of the governmental action on his
interests and to assert a meritorious First Amendment claim.213

But these are hardly reasons at all. The first simply restates the basic
First Amendment principle that infringements of First Amendment rights
must not only be justified by a sufficiently important state interest but also
must be tailored to achieve that interest.214 However, whether an agency
fee is tailored to achieve the state interest in labor peace through the
exclusive representation system has nothing to do with meta rights. The
212. See supra Part I.B.1.
213. Chi. Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 302–03 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
214. Underscoring this point, the Hudson Court cited a list of cases, quoting language
describing the narrow tailoring requirement in parentheticals. See id. at 303 n.11.
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second states that objectors must be able to challenge an improperly
assessed agency fee but does not explain why doing so requires meta rights;
after all, dissenters could always file a lawsuit in state or federal court, as
most civil liberties plaintiffs (including the parents of children who have
been wrongly compelled to say the Pledge of Allegiance) must do. The
Court later rejects this argument in conclusory fashion: because ―the
agency shop itself is ‗a significant impingement on First Amendment
rights,‘ the government and union have a responsibility to provide
procedures that minimize that impingement and that facilitate a nonunion
employee‘s ability to protect his rights.‖215
Hudson‘s only other explanatory statement comes in a footnote:
―Procedural safeguards often have a special bite in the First Amendment
context.‖216 This statement is followed by a list of citations to general First
Amendment principles, such as the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines.
Here again, these principles do not explain why meta rights are necessary in
the union (or bar dues) context; they simply explain that courts approach
first order questions about First Amendment rights in a way designed to
ensure adequate First Amendment ―breathing space.‖217 In other words, the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines do not notify people of their First
Amendment rights, nor do they encourage individuals to invoke their
rights—they simply make it more likely that plaintiffs will succeed if they
become aware of their rights and choose to file suit. To be sure, the
existence of First Amendment doctrines like vagueness and overbreadth
may make plaintiffs more willing to sue by strengthening what would
215. Id. at 307–08 n.20 (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435
(1984)). The Court offers a similar—and similarly unhelpful—explanation for the notice
requirement.
Basic considerations of fairness, as well as concern for the First Amendment rights
at stake, also dictate that the potential objectors be given sufficient information to
gauge the propriety of the union‘s fee. Leaving the nonunion employees in the
dark about the source of the figure for the agency fee—and requiring them to
object in order to receive information—does not adequately protect the careful
distinctions drawn in Abood.
Id. at 306.
216. Id. at 303 n.12 (quoting G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1373 (10th ed. 1980)).
217. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963) (citations omitted) (―The
objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not depend upon absence of fair
notice to a criminally accused or upon unchanneled delegation of legislative powers, but
upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a
penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application. . . . Because First
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area
only with narrow specificity.‖). The doctrines cited by the Court are closer to the
―prophylactic rights‖ that David Strauss discusses in The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules. See
generally Strauss, supra note 20. These are decisional rules that reduce the risk that
impermissible government action will go unremedied. See id. at 196–97 (discussing, in the
First Amendment context, how ―the requirement of clear standards reduces the danger that
speech will be suppressed unlawfully‖). While it is almost certainly the case that meta rights
also decrease the likelihood of First Amendment violations, and therefore meta rights might
be considered a subspecies of prophylactic rights, the existence of some prophylactic rights
in the First Amendment context does not explain the need for meta rights in some contexts
and not others.

890

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

otherwise be weak or nonexistent claims,218 but the same can be said any
time rights are strengthened. What is different about meta rights like those
established in Hudson is that they put into place structures designed to
educate potential objectors about rights themselves or about relevant facts
on the ground that otherwise would not be available until the discovery
stage of a lawsuit. Or else—as in the case of Knox‘s opt-in requirement—
meta rights encourage individuals to choose (or to default into) rights, such
as non-speech instead of speech.219 Subsequent cases, including Knox,
offer little additional clarity. The agricultural advertising cases are
similarly silent on this issue.
This state of affairs stands in contrast to Miranda, where the Court
offered a far more detailed description of why a warning is sometimes
necessary to the enforcement of the right against self-incrimination—
specifically, that police are specially trained to discourage rights
invocations and that, by design, individuals in police custody do not have
other sources of information available to them, thereby decreasing suspects‘
baseline level of willingness or ability to invoke their rights.220 In other
words, Miranda‘s meta rights are designed to counteract coercive
conditions that make self-help implausible; where such conditions are not
present (as during the traffic stop in Berkemer), police need not notify
individuals of their rights against self-incrimination, whether or not they are
actually aware of them.
The reason for notice rights in the class action context (and the
procedural due process context generally) is similarly clear. As the Mullane
Court emphasized, the danger is that absent plaintiffs may literally have no
idea that a class action has been filed.221 Even without the coercion that is
present in the Miranda context, self-help is implausible; for absent class
members to exercise their opt-out rights without first having received notice
of the case itself, they would have to monitor court dockets around the
country.222 Likewise, procedural due process requires that individuals
218. The overbreadth doctrine allows plaintiffs to challenge a law if ―a substantial
number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute‘s plainly
legitimate sweep,‖ even if the plaintiff‘s own speech may constitutionally be regulated.
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash.
State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)). Thus, a speaker who lacks a
plausible argument that the government is impermissibly restricting his own speech may
nonetheless decide to sue if the applicable statute impermissibly regulates others‘ speech.
219. I discuss why the opt-in default encourages bargaining unit or bar association
members to exercise their rights not to pay only the agency fee portion of union or bar dues
in Part II.C.2.
220. See supra Part I.B.1.
221. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950).
222. This explains why Mullane requires that class members be notified of the existence
of a lawsuit to which they are parties but does not necessarily explain why class members
must be advised of their rights to opt out. However, reasons are readily apparent. First, a
notice that simply informs class members of their party status could be subtly misleading, as
class members may naturally assume that the notice is a complete accounting of everything
they need to know about the class action. Second, the marginal costs of providing
information about opt-out rights is negligible. Third, class counsel, who is responsible for
effectuating the mandatory notice, owes a fiduciary duty to absent class members, which is
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receive notice of basic facts necessary to participate meaningfully in a
hearing, but not notice of their legal rights.223
The reasoning behind the Miranda warning and the class action
notice/opt-out scheme both point towards the feasibility of self-help as an
overarching guiding principle in determining whether meta rights are
necessary to protect rights against compelled speech and subsidization.
While it is not always wise or appropriate to import principles from one
constitutional context into another,224 several factors here weigh in favor of
importing. First, the use of similar interpretive tools across constitutional
contexts promotes predictability in the development of the law. Second,
there is the relative similarity of the underlying factual circumstances; each
context involves a state actor‘s request that individuals waive constitutional
privileges not to speak (or, in the class action context, not to petition).
Third, there is the practical point that, absent any other useful explanation
of meta rights in the compelled speech and subsidization context, self-help
holds out promise as an organizing principle. Finally, the Court itself has at
times suggested that self-help is relevant to the compelled speech and
subsidization analysis.225
Accordingly, I next consider the extent to which the Court‘s
jurisprudence in the compelled speech and subsidization context already

consistent with providing class members with information about possible courses of action in
a case. See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Defendant’s Obligation to Ensure Adequate
Representation in Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 511, 513 (2006) (―[C]lass counsel‘s
responsibility to ensure that absent class members are accorded adequate representation is a
serious and central due process obligation—indeed, class counsel owes a fiduciary duty to
the absent class members.‖).
223. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
224. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 676 (2011) (providing an ―account of the strategic
deployment of borrowing to narrow constitutional remedial doctrine, and of convergence‘s
acceleration of that effect, offer[ing] a rare look at the darker side of these processes‖).
225. For example, the Court relied in part upon the availability of self-help in determining
that there had been no First Amendment violation in CLS v. Martinez, a case about whether a
religious student group was entitled to exemption from a public university‘s ―all comers‖
policy. 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978–79 (2010). The Court rejected CLS‘s claim in part because
CLS could easily avoid the ―all comers‖ policy by simply not seeking recognition as a
student group, and instead meeting off-campus. Thus, the relative ease of opting out of the
entire student group program supported the Court‘s conclusion that Hastings did not have to
exempt CLS from the ―all comers‖ policy. While CLS involved a rights question (rather
than a meta rights question), factors undergirding a holding of no First Amendment violation
should apply a fortiori to the question of whether First Amendment rights-holders require the
protection provided by meta rights. In addition, the Gobitis Court observed that parents
could opt out of sending their children to public school and implied that the ability to opt out
of public school altogether lessened the burden imposed on First Amendment rights by
requiring students to recite the Pledge. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598–
99 (1940) (citing Pierce v. Soc‘y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1923)). However, while it is
undoubtedly true that the right to enroll their children in private school could have protected
some parents who wanted Pledge-free schooling for their children, private school is beyond
the reach of many parents (and ignores situations in which children and parents disagree
about the desirability of saying the Pledge). Thus, the rejection of Gobitis in Barnette does
not undermine the relevance of self-help to this analysis, particularly considering the
Martinez Court‘s reliance on that consideration.
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reflects the plausibility of self-help in different compelled speech and
subsidization contexts.
B. Self-Help and Compelled Speech and Subsidization
As this section shows, it is relatively easy for dissenters to exercise their
First Amendment rights against compelled speech or subsidization—easier,
certainly, than it is for suspects undergoing custodial interrogation to
exercise their Fifth Amendment rights to silence, or for absent class
members to discover their status without notice. Still, the extent to which
self-help is a realistic strategy varies among different compelled speech and
subsidization contexts. Consideration of the ease and availability of selfhelp in the context of compelled speech and subsidization suggests that at
best, meta rights should be distributed differently than they currently are;
arguably, they are mostly unnecessary. Accordingly, this section discusses
the likelihood that different groups of potential dissenters would be able to
exercise their rights against compelled speech or subsidization without the
benefit of meta rights.
The self-help rationale could be implicated either by Miranda-style
coercion226 or where the facts needed to understand that rights are at stake
are somehow hidden, as in the class action and procedural due process
contexts. Importantly, this lack of factual knowledge is distinct from
situations in which individuals are aware of the facts that give rise to a
right, but unaware of the legal consequences of those facts—as the saying
goes, ignorance of the law is no excuse.227
Accordingly, this section discusses barriers to remaining silent or
declining to subsidize speech in the various contexts in which the Court has
found a right to avoid compelled speech or subsidization. It also discusses
the closely related issue of government interests in not providing meta
rights, such as expense or disruption.
1. Barnette Rights
While Barnette rights are not accompanied by meta rights,228 Barnette
violations raise significant questions about self-help and coercion. Schools
226. In the Miranda context, police questioning encourages individuals to waive their
rights to remain silent. However, it is less clear that institutional actions in the compelled
speech context should be viewed as soliciting waivers of the right not to speak, rather than
soliciting individuals to exercise their affirmative right to speak. The latter characterization
emphasizes that both not speaking and speaking are protected First Amendment activity, a
point taken up again in Part II.C.
227. Mark Osiel, Rights to Do Grave Wrong, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 107, 126 (2013) (―Our
legal system may generally presume a knowledge of the law, as when it declares (with rare
exceptions) that ‗ignorance of the law is no excuse.‘‖); cf. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules
& Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 645–48
(1984) (describing examples and limited counterexamples of maxim that ignorance of the
law is no excuse). For a discussion of legal and factual ignorance in the procedural due
process context, see also supra Part I.B.2.
228. Martin Guggenheim offers anecdotal evidence of this, describing a symposium at
which he asked the audience whether they knew, as elementary children, of their Barnette
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have unique power over students. This is in part because of their age; we
often assume that children cannot invoke their rights in settings where we
would expect more of adults.229 Further, the Court has observed that an
atmosphere of vague coercion can pervade the school setting. In the
context of school prayer, the Court has recognized these dynamics, holding
that children are uniquely susceptible to ideological coercion in the form of
peer pressure, and that this ―indirect coercion‖ can rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.230 Further, while some parents may assist their
children in standing up to school officials who would compel the Pledge,
this is at best a partial solution, akin to saying that the fact that attorneys
can help suspects invoke their rights to remain silent vitiates the need for
the Miranda warning.
Further, schools may prevent students from learning information
necessary to exercise self-help—school is the most likely setting for
students to learn of their Barnette rights, and schools that actively violate
those rights by punishing students who do not say the Pledge are unlikely to
teach about them.231 As Martin Guggenheim has observed, ―[s]chool
boards and teachers go about their daily business as if Barnette had ruled
that teachers may require all students in the class to recite the Pledge.‖232
And, because students (especially elementary school students) often have
restricted access to other sources of information about rights (such as the
internet), a school may in fact be the only available source of information
about rights not to say the Pledge. Although this type of legal ignorance is
typically insufficient to support meta rights, it arguably carries special
rights. See generally Guggenheim, supra note 188. Only a single person (out of an audience
of seventy) claimed to have been aware of his or her rights. Id. at 72–73. It is possible that
some parents will be aware of students‘ Barnette rights, and counsel their children
accordingly, though this possibility will not aid students who do not happen to consult with
their parents about whether they may disobey school officials in the Pledge context.
229. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) (observing, in the
context of whether student was entitled to Miranda warning during interrogation by police
officer at child‘s school, that ―[t]he law has historically reflected the same assumption that
children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an
incomplete ability to understand the world around them‖).
230. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (―[T]he school district‘s supervision
and control of a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer
pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence
during the invocation and benediction. This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as
real as any overt compulsion.‖); see also Greene, supra note 188, at 454 (observing that
Weisman ―rests . . . on equating psychological coercion with legal coercion in the public
school setting‖ and arguing that applying this standard in the Pledge of Allegiance context
would result in a holding that it is unconstitutional for teachers to lead their classes in
reciting the Pledge).
231. Of course, most public schools do not actively compel students to recite the Pledge
of Allegiance. However, this fact alone should not defeat the need for meta rights.
Analogously, the Court has observed that many police departments do not coerce or mistreat
suspects during custodial interrogations, yet the Court still held that the Miranda warning is
necessary. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) (―[W]e have no doubt that, in
conducting most custodial interrogations of persons arrested for misdemeanor traffic
offenses, the police behave responsibly . . . the same might be said of custodial
interrogations of persons arrested for felonies.‖).
232. See Guggenheim, supra note 188, at 73.
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weight where children are concerned. This is both because it is coupled
with the coercion described above, and because the presumption of legal
knowledge is simply weaker.233
In other words, the argument that meta rights are necessary in the Pledge
context is relatively strong—at minimum it is stronger than the argument in
the union or bar association context. Just as the Miranda Court was
concerned with the probability that institutional coercion would render
suspects unable to exercise their rights to silence, coercive features in many
public schools prevent children from exercising their rights absent
additional notice or structural protections. Further, while schools have a
special need to maintain order, there is no reason that informing students of
their Barnette rights need be disruptive. For example, Guggenheim
proposes that schools should inform students of their Barnette rights in a
way that ―cultivate[s] an appreciation for the flag by teaching students the
constitutional principles involved when we permit the flag salute.‖234
2. License Plates
In comparison to the Pledge context, there are fewer barriers to the
exercise of self-help by those who object to displaying the state motto on
their license plates, another area in which dissenters receive no meta rights.
To begin, these objectors are older teenagers or adults—they are necessarily
old enough both to drive and register a vehicle—so it is reasonable to
assume that they are at least on inquiry notice of their rights.235
Yet, barriers are not non-existent. First, objectors would then have to
withstand traffic stops by police officers enforcing otherwise lawful
statutory prohibitions against defacing license plates. During these stops,
objectors may have to explain their reasons for defacing the motto in an
attempt to avoid a ticket, or worse.236 Further, these stops could be
233. Other areas of law reflect the commonsense idea that children should not be
presumed to have the same legal awareness as adults. E.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin
C. Zipursky, Shielding Duty: How Attending to Assumption of Risk, Attractive Nuisance,
and Other “Quaint” Doctrines Can Improve Decisionmaking in Negligence Cases, 79 S.
CAL. L. REV. 329, 353 (2006) (discussing attractive nuisance doctrine‘s reliance on idea ―that
children constitute a special category of trespasser that ought to be treated differently by the
law because, among other things, they lack the experience, maturity, and knowledge to grasp
the significance of ethereal legal boundaries‖).
234. Guggenheim, supra note 188, at 81.
235. Not only is this assumption reasonable based on drivers‘ ages, it is also
straightforward even for nonlawyers to find information about Wooley. For example, a
Google search for ―defaced license plate First Amendment‖ leads to information about the
Wooley case, as does a search for ―do I have to display the state motto on my license plate.‖
Google Search for ―defaced license plate First Amendment,‖ GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com (search ―defaced license plate First Amendment‖; then click search);
Google Search for ―do I have to display the state motto on my license plate,‖ GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com (search ―do I have to display the state motto on my license plate‖;
then click search). Further, the decision to deface a license plate need not be made on the
spot and under pressure, in contrast to a decision to invoke one‘s Fifth Amendment rights
during custodial interrogation.
236. A routine traffic stop for a defaced license plate can quickly escalate if, for example,
the driver is also uninsured, or if police claim to find evidence of another crime during the
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daunting; although the Court in Berkemer described the experience of
withstanding police custody during a traffic stop as considerably less
coercive than a custodial interrogation, the process of explaining one‘s
disagreement with the ―majority‖237 to an officer who is likely to agree with
the majority (and who may not know about Wooley238) could be
intimidating.239 Still, compelled display of state mottos on license plates
does not involve the same degree of governmental coercion that existed in
Miranda, or even that exists in the Barnette context; though empirical
evidence of police abuse of motorists who do not display the state motto
could show otherwise, such evidence does not now exist.
Conversely, there would be some financial cost to providing notice to all
drivers of their Wooley rights, though these costs would be minimal if state
motor vehicle departments simply printed a short description of the right
announced in Wooley on vehicle registration forms. However, notice rights
are unlikely to relieve dissenting motorists of the burdens described above
in any meaningful way, given that they would still have to distinguish
themselves from scofflaws. Thus, if meta rights are the exception rather
than the rule—and it is clear from the Court‘s present case law that this is
the case—then Wooley seems to be a poor candidate for meta rights.
3. Unions and Bar Associations
As discussed in Part I.C.1–2, objectors are entitled to opt out of funding
union or bar association political speech, though they may be compelled to
fund activities that are ―germane‖ to the association‘s mission. Further,
union members are entitled to receive annual, individualized notice of their
opt-out rights, as well as a breakdown showing how the chargeable fee was
calculated, and a nonjudicial process for challenging that calculation—
attorneys are probably entitled to the same, though courts have been less
aggressive in this context.240 Finally, union bargaining unit members must
give affirmative consent to the non-chargeable portion of a midyear dues
increase (an ―opt-in default‖).241
stop. In this event, police may be able to seize the vehicle and arrest its occupants. Further,
particular jurisdictions may have policies of aggressively pursuing grounds for vehicle
seizures during traffic stops in order to make up for budget shortfalls. See Sarah Stillman,
Taken, NEW YORKER, Aug. 12, 2013, at 48, 50 (describing civil forfeitures resulting from
traffic stops, and reporting that ―[m]any officers contend that their departments would
collapse if the practice [of civil forfeitures] were too heavily regulated, and that a valuable
public-safety measure would be lost‖).
237. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
238. Following the Court‘s decision in Wooley, the Maynards moved to Connecticut,
where they were again ticketed for covering the state motto on their license plate, though the
ticket was apparently overturned. David Hudson, George Maynard Recalls License-Plate
Ordeal, Free-Speech Victory, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Nov. 30, 2001),
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/george-maynard-recalls-license-plate-ordeal-freespeech-victory.
239. In addition, objectors would have to deface the plates themselves (unless the state
happens to offer motto-free plates), a task requiring supplies and ingenuity—at minimum, a
roll of electrical tape, though the dissenter in Wooley also cut the state motto from his plate.
240. See supra Part I.C.1.
241. See supra Part I.C.1.

896

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

Put in procedural due process terms, bargaining unit members and
attorneys are entitled to, at minimum, the equivalent of notice and a
hearing.242 However, union and bar association meta rights cannot be
explained by reference to procedural due process. First, procedural due
process rights typically do not attach to non-adjudicative deprivations.243
Second, public employees who undergo the much greater hardship of losing
their jobs altogether do not always receive as much process as bar
association or union objectors.244
Moreover, the case either for coercion or for lack of factual knowledge is
weak. As to lack of factual knowledge, there is no mystery surrounding the
existence of the union or bar association, or the obligation to pay fees to
either. Attorneys typically pay their required annual fees by check or credit
card, making the fact of payment unavoidable.245 Bargaining unit members
often have their dues or fees deducted automatically from their pay, but
they often must first consent to the deductions, and in any event the
payment will be reflected on each employee‘s pay stub every pay period.246
This should be enough to prompt a dissenting employee to seek information
about how to opt out of the non-germane portion of union dues; for
example, the employee might ask a manager or human resources employee.
More troubling is the fact that the union or bar association itself would be
the only source of information about the calculation of the chargeable fee.
If a bar association is recalcitrant about providing this information,
objectors would be faced with a choice between paying full freight and then
seeking a refund, or else paying nothing (or paying a fraction of dues based
on a guess), and risking disciplinary action. Likewise, employees who
suspect that the agency fee was improperly calculated would face difficulty
in verifying their suspicions, though resourceful objectors could find
information about union spending in annual reports filed by labor unions
and made available on the Department of Labor website.247 Thus, the case
for lack of knowledge, while certainly weaker than in other contexts where
individuals enjoy notice rights, is not entirely nonexistent.
The possibility of Miranda-level coercion that dissuades objectors from
invoking their rights, however, is remote at best. In the bar association
context, it is unclear that any opportunities for coercion exist at all, given
242. See supra Part I.C.1.
243. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 244–45 (1973) (noting due process
distinction between adjudication and other types of government action).
244. See supra note 56. While this goes only to the hardship prong, the other two
prongs—risk of erroneous deprivation and government interest—do not translate easily into
this context, which itself suggests another reason that procedural due process does not
explain the presence of meta rights in this context.
245. See, e.g., Automated Installment Plan Enrollment Form, N.Y. BAR ASS‘N, available
at http://www.nysba.org/uploadedFiles/NYSBA/Membership/Automated_Installment_Plan
_for_Dues/2014_AIP_Enrollment_Form.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
246. Jeffrey H. Keefe, A Reconsideration and Empirical Evaluation of Wellington’s and
Winter’s, The Unions and the Cities, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL‘Y J. 251, 265 (2013).
247. These reports are required by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,
29 U.S.C. § 431 (2012), and are accessible at http://www.dol.gov/olms/ (last visited Oct. 19,
2014).
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that most attorneys have relatively little mandatory contact with their state
bar associations. Bargaining unit members, of course, come into contact
with union representatives and supporters on a regular basis. However,
even if union organizers or members pressure workers to pay full freight—
perhaps by posting a list of agency fee payers in the breakroom 248—this
pressure would not rise to the level necessary to dissuade determined
objectors from opting out, absent extreme circumstances.
Finally, as outlined here, the presumption of legal knowledge is wellfounded—in fact much more than in the cases like Berkemer. Attorneys, of
course, are sophisticated about legal rights; to wit, most state bar exams test
on the First Amendment.249 Bargaining unit members, while not required
to pass an exam about their rights as a condition of employment, are
nonetheless relatively likely to be aware (or at least constructively aware) of
their First Amendment rights, even without the Hudson notice. Information
about union dissenters‘ rights is remarkably plentiful and easily accessed
online;250 in addition, employers seeking to weaken employees‘ ties to a
union may be anxious to provide information about opt-out rights.
That bargaining unit members could plausibly be expected to exercise
their Abood rights without the benefit of meta rights like the Hudson notice
is underscored by the experience of individuals who object to union
membership on religious grounds. These employees often have a statutory
entitlement to an accommodation from their union, such as the opportunity
to donate the amount of union dues or the agency fee to a charity,251 but do
not necessarily receive specific notice of their rights to object.252 Further,
once they do learn of their rights, they generally exercise them by
contacting the union and affirmatively requesting an accommodation; if one
is not provided, they may sue.253 Likewise, objectors in right to work states
do not necessarily receive individual notices stating that they are not

248. See, e.g., Leah Barkoukis, Michigan Union Publishes “Freeloaders” List of Workers
Who Opted Out, TOWNHALL.COM (Feb. 13, 2014), http://townhall.com/tipsheet/
leahbarkoukis/2014/02/13/michigan-union-publishes-freeloaders-list-n1794694.
249. The Multistate Bar Examination tests First Amendment freedoms. See NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, 2013 MULTISTATE BAR EXAMINATION INFORMATION
BOOKLET 8, available at http://www.law2.byu.edu/page/categories/student_resources/bar_
prep/2013/MBE_Information_Booklet.pdf.
250. A Google search for ―mandatory union dues‖ leads to a host of information about
objectors‘ rights and ongoing lawsuits challenging union dues and fees assessments. Google
Search for ―mandatory union dues,‖ GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (search ―mandatory
union dues‖; then click search).
251. See supra Part I.C.1.
252. They may receive generalized notice via the notice regarding Title VII rights that
many employers are required to post. This poster notifies employees that they may seek a
reasonable accommodation of their religious practices. See EEOC, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY IS THE LAW, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/upload/eeoc_
self_print_poster.pdf.
253. An Employee’s Guide to Union Dues and Religious Do Nots, NAT‘L RIGHT TO WORK
LEGAL DEF. FOUND., available at http://www.nrtw.org/ro2.htm#ro2FN8 (last visited Oct. 19,
2014).
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required to pay any money to their union,254 though significant numbers of
employees nonetheless succeed in invoking their rights under such laws.255
Thus, the largest barrier to self-help in the union and bar association
context is the lack of publicly available knowledge about how the agency
fee is calculated. Yet the Hudson procedure goes well beyond remedying
this informational gap. Moreover, even if Hudson is explicable in terms of
self-help, Knox is not—there is simply no plausible case to be made that the
need to mail a form in order to opt out imposes the type of self-help barrier
that motivate meta rights in other contexts.
4. Agricultural Advertising
Finally, the least significant obstacle to self-help, and correspondingly
the least compelling case for meta rights, comes in cases like United Foods.
First, the concept of Miranda-style coercion means little in the context of a
business entity. It is equally difficult to imagine how a knowledge deficit
could arise: not only will producers have all the factual knowledge
necessary to discover a claim, they are also likely to be represented by
counsel. Thus, there exists neither the knowledge gap nor the institutional
coercion that has justified meta rights in other contexts.
Given the relevance of self-help to the establishment of meta rights in
other contexts—and the lack of alternate explanation for meta rights in the
compelled speech context—the current allocation of meta compelled speech
rights is simply bizarre. For example, it is incongruous that, in cases
governed by United Foods, marketing associations may not even assess
contributions for generic advertising. In other words, these producers, who
are most able to engage in self-help to avoid compelled speech or
subsidization, need not even opt out.256 Conversely, public school children
and their parents can make the strongest case for meta rights to defend
against compelled speech and subsidization, yet they are not entitled to any
meta rights at all.257 Finally, union members and attorneys receive
disproportionately robust meta rights, despite the lack of barriers to selfhelp.258

254. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-7-110 (2013) (providing that employers may post notice
of right to work law and must furnish notice upon request of an employee); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-1-206(b) (2012) (employers may post or distribute notice of state right to work
law provisions).
255. See Henry S. Farber, Union Membership in the United States: The Divergence
Between the Public and Private Sectors 28 (Princeton Univ., Working Paper No. 503, 2005),
available at http://harris.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/503.pdf.
256. Counterintuitively, it may have been the very ease of objection that led the Court to
strike down the program altogether; the Court‘s unstated assumption may have been that no
producer would ever contribute to generic advertising absent compulsion, and that therefore
it was a waste of time to do anything but eliminate the program.
257. See supra Part II.B.
258. See supra Part II.B.
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C. Structuring Meta Rights
Meta rights most often do little more than provide potential dissenters
with notice, though some may do more to facilitate or even encourage
objectors to exercise their rights. This section separately considers notice
and structural meta rights, focusing on their potential unintended effects on
institutional or willing individual speakers.
1. Notice Rights
As their name suggests, notice rights simply inform individuals about
their rights; both the Miranda warning and the Hudson notice are examples.
When a nongovernmental actor, such as a union or bar association, is
required to issue a notice regarding compelled speech or subsidization, an
irony arises: the notice itself is a form of compelled speech, which in turn
raises its own First Amendment question.259
The Court has previously recognized that state-mandated disclosures by
private speakers are subject to First Amendment scrutiny. In Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel,260 the Court reviewed Ohio‘s requirement
that attorneys advertising their availability on a contingent fee basis also
disclose that unsuccessful clients would be required to pay costs.261 The
Court conducted an undue burden analysis, weighing Ohio‘s interest in the
compelled disclosure against the burden imposed on attorneys.262 It easily
concluded that the requirement did not impose an undue burden on
attorneys; conversely, the Court observed that the notice protected
consumers who were likely to assume that bringing a losing case would be
free, when in fact they might incur substantial costs.263 Thus, the disclosure
requirement passed constitutional muster.
Zauderer involved a burden on commercial speech, which is entitled to
less protection than ideological speech.264 In Citizens United, in contrast,
the Court considered the standard applicable to compelled disclaimers and

259. See David Fagundes, State Actors As First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 1637, 1641, 1643–44 (2006) (noting that ―[c]ourts and commentators alike have long
dismissed the notion that the Speech Clause could serve as a source of constitutional
protection for government speech,‖ but observing that a small number of courts have held
that the First Amendment can protect state or local government speakers whose speech has
been limited by the federal government).
260. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
261. Id. at 652–53.
262. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010)
(explaining that under Zauderer, ―[u]njustified or unduly burdensome disclosure
requirements offend the First Amendment by chilling protected speech, but ‗an advertiser‘s
rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to
the State‘s interest in preventing deception of consumers‘‖); see also Nicole B. Cásarez,
Don’t Tell Me What to Say: Compelled Commercial Speech & the First Amendment, 63 MO.
L. REV. 929, 952–53 (1998) (describing the Zauderer test and observing that ―commercial
disclosure requirements have been subjected to less stringent First Amendment analysis‖
than compelled ―political, religious, or ideological speech‖).
263. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652–53 & n.15.
264. Id. at 637.
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disclosures under Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.265 The Court upheld
both requirements, but it first applied ―‗exacting scrutiny,‘ which requires a
‗substantial relation‘ between the disclosure requirement and a ‗sufficiently
important‘ governmental interest.‖266 In particular, the Court relied on the
government‘s interest in providing information to the electorate. 267 The
Court did not quantify the costs of the disclosure or disclaimer
requirements, though it did consider as one cost the possibility that
disclosure would chill donors‘ speech.268 Although the Court deemed this
possibility insufficient to defeat the disclosure requirement, it implied that it
might decide differently a case with a clear record of ―threats or reprisals‖
against donors.269
At a minimum, then, notice meta rights—to the extent owed by private
associations—should be subject to the Zauderer test. However disclosure
requirements that, like the Hudson notice, are imposed as conditions of
engaging in political speech should receive stricter scrutiny under Citizens
United. Undoubtedly, informing institutionally affiliated individuals of
their rights to avoid compelled speech and subsidization is a governmental
interest that is at least as significant as providing information to the
electorate. Likewise, there is a close relationship between that interest and
disclosure. Thus, there is a strong argument in favor of the constitutionality
of requiring unions or bar associations to disclose information about the
right against compelled speech or subsidization. However, this abstract
analysis should not conclude the inquiry. There remains the fact-specific
question of whether there is an alternative method of notifying dissenters of
their rights, while imposing a smaller burden on institutional speakers.270
Hudson is more burdensome than the disclosure requirements approved
in either Zauderer or Citizens United, where the respective speakers had to
append a short statement to communications that they were making
265. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 367 (2010). The disclaimer consists of a
statement, to be delivered during any televised electioneering communication, that
―[advertiser] is responsible for the content of this advertising,‖ that the communication was
not authorized by a candidate or candidate committee, and that provides the name and
address of the person or group that funded the advertisement. Id. at 366. The required
disclosure statement, applicable to anyone spending more than $10,000 in a calendar year on
electioneering communications, was to be filed with the FEC and list ―the person making the
expenditure, the amount of the expenditure, the election to which the communication was
directed, and the names of certain contributors.‖ Id.
266. Id. at 366–67 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 66 (1976)).
267. Id. at 367.
268. Id. at 370.
269. Id.; see also Leslie Kendrick, Disclosure and Its Discontents, 27 J.L. & POL. 575,
575–76 (2012) (―Compelled disclosure . . . has long been assessed not by its purposes, but by
its detrimental effects on expressive association.‖).
270. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490–91 (1995) (holding, in the
commercial speech context, that ―the availability of [less speech-restrictive alternatives], all
of which could advance the Government‘s asserted interest in a manner less intrusive to
respondent‘s First Amendment rights, indicates that [statute] is more extensive than
necessary‖); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending
Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2422 (1996) (stating that ―[a] law is not narrowly
tailored if there are less speech-restrictive means available that would serve the interest
essentially as well as would the speech restriction‖).
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anyway, or file a single disclosure report with a government agency. And,
it is not clear that the additional burden imposed by the individualized
Hudson notice is justified, given the available alternatives. For example,
bargaining unit members could be notified of their rights via a posted
notice, similar to the notices that advise employees of many other
workplace rights.271 This would not work for attorneys, who do not all
work in the same place, but a notice displayed prominently on the bar
association‘s website could prove equally useful.
Alternatively,
employers—who, after all, are parties to collective bargaining agreements
imposing union security clauses—could play a greater role in informing
employees of their rights.272 They, rather than unions, could give
employees notice of their Abood rights.273 For example, during new
employee orientation—when the employee must fill out countless other
forms and make numerous other elections related to retirement withholding,
health insurance electives, and other benefits—the employee could also be
provided with the Hudson notice and a copy of the paperwork necessary to
opt out of the non-germane portion of union dues. Similarly, employees
could then change their agency fee elections once annually, just as they
change their insurance elections during the annual ―open enrollment‖
period.
The existence of these alternative methods of notifying dissenters of their
First Amendment rights calls into question whether the Hudson procedure
would survive the Zauderer/Citizens United inquiry. And, this is not the
only aspect of the Hudson/Knox process that implicates the First
Amendment rights of institutional speakers.
2. Opt-Ins, Opt-Outs, and Sticky Defaults
Knox called into question the continuing validity of the opt-out default in
the union dues context based on a posited mismatch between the likely
preferences of employees and the likely effects of an opt-out as compared to
an opt-in. Accordingly, this subsection begins by evaluating whether Knox
correctly assumed that most individuals who pay full freight without joining
their union have a latent preference not to pay, and concludes that few
meaningful predictions can be made about these individuals‘ preferences.
271. See “EEO is the Law” Poster, EEOC, available at http://www1.eeoc.gov/
employers/poster.cfm (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (stating that ―[t]he law requires an
employer to post a notice describing the Federal laws prohibiting job discrimination based
on race, color, sex, national origin, religion, age, equal pay, disability or genetic
information‖).
272. Of course, individual unions may make the choice to continue providing the Hudson
notice themselves, preferring not to cede control of this process to employers. However, it is
not necessarily the case that every union will make this choice, particularly where they enjoy
stable and long-term bargaining relationships with employers.
273. This does not solve the problem of how to provide potential objectors with notice of
the union‘s calculation of the agency fee. This disclosure could still be provided by the
union, either directly to objectors or via the employer, or—similar to the disclosure required
in Citizens United, which is submitted to the Federal Election Commission—via the
Department of Labor website.
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Then, drawing on principles of behavioral psychology, this subpart plays
out the consequences of Knox‘s novel First Amendment principle that
speech defaults can violate the First Amendment if they do not accord with
the likely preferences of covered individuals. It argues that if an opt-out
violates the First Amendment (because some individuals fail to overcome
the speech default), then an opt-in default should pose a problem of the
same magnitude where different individuals fail to overcome the nonspeech default. Thus, this subsection concludes that, taking Knox‘s First
Amendment premises at face value, an opt-in default should be as
problematic as an opt-out default.
Among behavioral psychologists, it is relatively uncontroversial that
switching from an opt-out to an opt-in default could have an effect on
individuals‘ outcomes. That is to say, it is plausible that the choice of optin/opt-out default could actually (if unconsciously) result in workers
adopting different statuses vis-à-vis their unions. If this fact has First
Amendment valence, then courts should be equally cognizant of the effects
of either default.
To begin, it is worth asking what behavioral psychology has to contribute
to constitutional law, and particularly to First Amendment analysis. Paul
Horwitz has observed that ―there is a natural fit between behavioral analysis
and First Amendment law. Much of our current free speech jurisprudence is
based on the assumption that the government should not regulate speech
because, in an unregulated marketplace, people will be perfectly capable of
responding rationally to speech.‖274 Behavioral psychology is devoted to
understanding the ―cognitive failings‖ that prevent people from responding
to situations rationally.275 Thus, a more sophisticated understanding of
these cognitive failings will allow courts and legislatures to tailor
restrictions on speech more carefully, achieving better results while
lessening burdens on speech.276 More importantly, the Court itself acts on
assumptions about behavior in compelled speech cases. For example, the
Abood Court relied on the possibility that bargaining unit members would
free ride on other workers‘ payments to their union in deciding to permit the
agency shop.277 Similarly, as I discuss in detail below, the Knox Court
drew on its own set of assumptions about the likely preferences of
bargaining unit members in deciding to require an opt-in regime for
midyear dues increases. In other words, the Court already bases rights and
meta rights regimes on assumptions about human behavior; introducing
behavioral psychology into the mix simply puts these assumptions on
firmer empirical footing.278
274. Paul Horwitz, Free Speech As Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in
the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003).
275. Id. at 10.
276. Id. (―[B]ehavioral analysis may offer valuable insights into two crucial First
Amendment questions: how we decide whether particular speech acts may have unduly
harmful effects, and who should make such decisions.‖).
277. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 224 (1977).
278. Such considerations are not limited to the union context. For example, the Court in
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011), considered behavioral incentives in
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The Knox majority adopted an opt-in regime based largely on its
conjecture that bargaining unit members who, after receiving the Hudson
notice, had neither joined the union nor opted out of funding its nongermane activities probably did not want to fund union political speech.279
Essentially, the Court assumed that many of these employees had not opted
out because, while they preferred not to pay, their preferences not to pay
were weaker than their preferences not to devote the time or attention to
filling out the necessary paperwork.280 However, this conclusion was
flawed; in fact, one can say very little about the likely preferences of
employees who pay full freight without joining the union.
Why might a bargaining unit employee not join a union, but still pay the
full amount of union dues? The Knox Court viewed this state of affairs as
contradictory, evidencing a mistake or lapse in attention by the
employee.281 Yet, there are at least two plausible explanations for it. First,
there are rational reasons not to join a union even if one agrees with (and
wants to fund) the union‘s political speech. For example, bargaining unit
members who do not join the union are not subject to union discipline. 282
Thus, bargaining unit members who support the union‘s efforts beyond the
bargaining table, but who do not want to run the risk of eventually facing
union discipline might affirmatively and intentionally choose to pay full
freight without joining the union.
The second explanation, though, may be the more powerful one:
behavioral research shows that ―[d]efaults are sticky, and overcoming
inertia is difficult.‖283 This research suggests two important reasons that

evaluating the constitutionality of a restriction on the sale or use of certain information about
doctors‘ prescribing habits by pharmaceutical marketers. Specifically, the Vermont statute
under review restricted marketers from using physicians‘ information where the physicians
had not consented to such use. Id. at 2668–69. The Court observed that the law ―might
burden less speech if it came into operation only after an individual choice‖—in other words,
if it applied only to physicians that opted into coverage, rather than requiring physicians to
opt out of coverage. Id. at 2669 (adding that even this change ―would not necessarily save‖
the statute). Likewise, the Shutts Court also focused on behavioral incentives in choosing an
opt-out regime (rejecting the defendant‘s call for an opt-in). See Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 813–14 (1985). The Court based its analysis in significant part on the
economic interests, and associated likely courses of action, of absent class members. Id. at
813.
279. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int‘l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2290 (2012).
280. Id. (discussing ―employees who might not qualify as active ‗dissenters‘ but who
would nonetheless prefer to keep their own money‖).
281. Id. (posing the rhetorical question: ―And isn‘t it likely that most employees who
choose not to join the union that represents their bargaining unit prefer not to pay the full
amount of union dues?‖).
282. See, e.g., Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 435 (1969).
283. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 2010, 2036 (2013); see also Gary Minda, Freedom and Democracy in a World
Governed by Finance: Habermas and the Crisis in Europe: A Free Labor Response, 10
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 244, 269 (2013) (noting that Justice Breyer, in Knox, ―adopted
the conclusion of Sunstein and Thaler in finding that default rules play an important role in
influencing behavior of individuals who do not have ‗well defined preferences‘‖); Cass
Sunstein & Richard Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1159, 1171 (2003); Brian Olney, Paycheck Protection or Paycheck Deception? When
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some workers fail to overcome the default (here, to pay full freight without
joining the union). One is simple inertia—the employees may not have
made a decision at all, or they may have made a decision in the abstract, but
then failed to complete the necessary paperwork in time. For these workers,
there is no reason to assume that failure to overcome the default indicates a
desire not to pay for non-chargeable union expenses. True, it is possible
that if required to make a choice, they would opt out. Yet it is also possible
that they would resolve the supposed inconsistency by joining the union and
continuing to pay.284
A second reason for default stickiness is that employees may (correctly
or not) see the default as an implied endorsement or expectation. ―People
interpret defaults as a recommended course of action set out by policy
makers.‖285 Relatedly, individuals may take defaults as signals about what
most people do, meaning that ―following a simple heuristic of imitation
could lead to its widespread adoption.‖286 In other words, an opt-out
default might suggest to employees that most people pay full freight,
leading them to do the same in order to avoid being seen as free riders.
Conversely, an opt-in default might suggest paying is extraordinary, and
employees might decide that only suckers pay when they don‘t have to.287
If employees see either implied endorsement or description in the default
choice, they make a different decision than they would without the default.
Likewise, employees who are driven by inertia will have different outcomes
depending on the default. This is significant because it suggests that
beyond simply allowing non-dissenters to express their independently held
desires, court-imposed defaults and associated procedures can cause a larger
or smaller number of people to pay full freight for union representation. In
other words, opt-in defaults can have the effect of restricting the amount of
money available to labor unions with which to engage in political speech

Government ―Subsidies‖ Silence Political Speech 13–15 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with Fordham Law Review).
284. Behavioral psychology also suggests a reason that the Knox majority presumed that
full-freight/non-union bargaining unit members preferred not to pay for the union‘s political
speech. Research has proven the existence of the ―availability heuristic,‖ in which people
―assess the likelihood of risks by asking how readily examples come to mind.‖ RICHARD H.
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 25 (2008). Knox was filed by a group of plaintiffs
who did, in fact, vigorously object to paying for the SEIU‘s non-chargeable expenses. Thus,
it is unsurprising that the majority deemed it likely that other employees also objected to
making these payments.
285. Eric J. Johnson & Daniel J. Goldstein, Decisions in Default, in THE BEHAVIORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 421 (Edlar Shafir ed., 2012).
286. Id. (citing Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 283, at 1171).
287. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 652 (2006) (explaining, in the context of private law, that ―a
transactor might fear that proposing an opt-out from the default will dissuade his potential
counterparty from entering into the agreement,‖ because ―the counterparty will suspect that
the proposer‘s decision to deviate from the norm and use an unfamiliar provision . . . is a
‗trick‘‖).
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independent of the level of support for the unions‘ speech among
bargaining unit members.288
Given this background, Knox‘s First Amendment analysis suggests that
the opt-in default would infringe upon First Amendment rights because it
would deter some bargaining unit members from paying full freight,
thereby decreasing the funds available for union political advocacy. But
this is not all; in addition, the rights of two distinct sets of bargaining unit
members would also be burdened. First, there are those who overcome the
default to pay full freight (with or without joining the union), who lose the
opportunity to have their voices amplified by the presence of those who are
unwittingly opted out of funding union political speech.289 Second, there
are those who are influenced not to pay full freight by the opt-in regime—in
other words, those who are dissuaded from funding political speech because
of Court-created meta rights. Even if these individuals use the money they
save to engage in other political speech, they have still lost an opportunity
to take part in a ―collective effort‖ by which ―individuals can make their
views known, when, individually, their voices would be faint or lost.‖290
Therefore, if the Court concludes that an opt-out regime violates the First
Amendment, then the inevitable presence of other workers, who would be
similarly disadvantaged by an opt-in regime, should eliminate that
possibility as well. In that case, there is a third possibility that the Court did
not consider but that holds promise to protect even the quasi-dissenters with
whom the Knox Court was concerned: instead of an opt-in or an opt-out
default, institutions could simply require affiliated individuals to make an
affirmative choice.291 Thus, unions, employers, or bar associations might
ask employees and attorneys to make a choice between paying full freight
and paying the agency fee. The advantage of such a scheme is that it avoids
288. It is not clear that the converse is true. At least one study suggests that opt-out
defaults do not significantly affect individual choices, and that the results of an opt-out
default closely approximate the results of requiring individuals to make affirmative choices.
See Olney, supra note 283, at 14–15. However, this research was performed in the context
of organ donation; additional research is needed to confirm that the same conclusion would
hold in the union or bar dues context.
289. Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The Constitutional Bounds of the Right of
Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821, 839 (2002) (arguing that ―[t]he Court conceived of
the right of association as belonging to the individual members—as augmenting the power of
their individual speech‖). The Court has recognized the First Amendment interests
associated with union speech. See Int‘l Ass‘n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773
(1961) (―[T]he fact that these expenditures are made for political activities is an additional
reason for reluctance to impose . . . an injunctive remedy. Whatever may be the powers of
Congress or the States to forbid unions altogether to make various types of political
expenditures . . . many of the expenditures involved in the present case are made for the
purpose of disseminating information as to candidates and programs and publicizing the
positions of the unions on them. As to such expenditures an injunction would work a
restraint on the expression of political ideas which might be offensive to the First
Amendment.‖).
290. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981); see
also Street, 367 U.S. at 773 (―[T]he majority also has an interest in stating its views without
being silenced by the dissenters.‖).
291. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 39–41 (2013)
(discussing ―active choosing‖ as an alternative to a default regime).
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suggesting to individuals that the state believes there is a ―right answer,‖
and instead conveys the message that speech and silence are equally valid
alternatives. While there are some downsides to requiring an active
choice—for example, some people may prefer not to be forced to expend
mental energy on weighing options292—this is the only way to avoid a
situation in which the government plays a role in determining whether
workers or attorneys will engage in political speech, thereby implicating the
First Amendment under Knox‘s logic.293
CONCLUSION
The Court‘s present ad hoc approach to meta rights has produced an
incoherent set of results. This is especially true in the First Amendment
context, where those most able to show coercion, information deficits, or
both receive no meta rights, while others receive extensive meta rights.
Accordingly, the Court should undertake a full-scale reconsideration of
meta rights, beginning with the First Amendment context. In doing so, the
Court should begin by addressing when and why meta rights are called for
at all. Next, to the extent the Court concludes that speech defaults implicate
the First Amendment, it should draw on advances in behavioral psychology
to anticipate the effects of meta rights on the speech of willing speakers as
well as dissenters.

292. Id. at 47 (discussing prospect that active choosing might be ―quite unwelcome‖
because of the time and learning curve demanded in making a choice).
293. A more systematic approach to meta rights questions will have significance far
beyond the compelled speech and subsidization context. For example, some statutory
schemes also create meta rights. To take one example, the NLRB recently promulgated a
rule requiring employers to notify their employees of their rights under the NLRA. 76 Fed.
Reg. 54006-01 (Aug. 30, 2011). To date, the rule has been struck down on statutory grounds
by two circuits, with the D.C. Circuit holding that the rule violated employer‘s statutory
speech rights. Nat‘l Ass‘n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 947, 955 (2013). Although both
decisions rested on the NLRA rather than the Constitution, the approach outlined in this
Article could also be usefully applied to reconciling employer and employee interests arising
under the Act as well. See generally Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152 (4th
Cir. 2013).

